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Introduction
Challenges to the rational actor model in law and economics are
almost as old as the field itself. Early skeptics about the economic
analysis of law were quick to marshal arguments from psychology
and other social sciences to undermine its claims.1 But in law,
critiques of the rational actor assumption by those who sympathize
with the basic objectives of economic analysis have been much less
common. The absence of sustained and comprehensive economic
analysis of legal rules from a perspective informed by insights about
actual human behavior makes for a significant contrast with other
fields of economics, where such “behavioral” analysis has become
common.2 This is especially odd since law is a domain where
behavioral analysis would appear to be particularly promising in light
of the fact that non-market behavior is frequently involved.
Our goal in this Article is to advance an approach to economic
analysis of law that is informed by a more accurate conception of
choice, one that reflects a better understanding of human behavior
and its well-springs. We build on and attempt to generalize earlier
work in law outlining behavioral findings by taking the two logical
next steps: proposing a systematic framework for a behavioral
approach to economic analysis of law, and using behavioral insights
to develop specific models and approaches addressing topics of
We acknowledge the helpful comments of Colin Camerer, David Charny,
Richard Craswell, Jon Elster, Nuno Garoupa, J.B. Heaton, Dan Kahan, Louis
Kaplow, Lewis Kornhauser, Larry Lessig, Steve Levitt, Mitch Polinsky, Eric
Posner, Richard Posner, Ricky Revesz, Steve Shavell, Ari Zweiman, and
participants at the Boston University Law School Faculty Workshop, the
Columbia Law School Law and Economics workshop, workshops at Harvard
Law School on law and economics and on rationality, the NBER Behavioral
Law and Economics Conference, the NYU Rational Choice Colloquium, and
the University of Chicago Law and Economics Workshop. Todd Murtha
(Harvard Law School Class of 1998) and Gil Seinfeld (Harvard Law School
Class of 2000) provided outstanding research assistance.
1
See, e.g., Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and
Ideology in the Coase Theorem, 52 S. Cal. L. Rev. 669 (1979); Duncan
Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A Critique, 33
Stan. L. Rev. 387 (1981); Arthur Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some
Realism About Nominalism, 60 Va. L. Rev. 451 (1974).
2
See, for example, volume 87, issue 5 of the American Economic Review, i n
which the first three articles involve behavioral economics.
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abiding interest in law and economics.3 The analysis of these
specific topics is preliminary and often in the nature of a proposal for
a research agenda; we touch on a wide range of issues in an effort to
show the potential uses of behavioral insights. The unifying idea in
our analysis is that behavioral economics allows us to model and
predict behavior of relevance to law with the tools of traditional
economic analysis, but with more accurate assumptions about
human behavior, and more accurate predictions and prescriptions
about law. Certainly a great deal of work would be necessary to
justify a final evaluation of most of the topics pursued here; there is
fertile ground for future research, both theoretical and empirical, and
one of our principal goals is to suggest some directions in which that
research might go.
We suggest that an approach based on behavioral economics will
help with the three functions of any proposed approach to law:
positive, prescriptive, and normative.4 The positive task, perhaps
most central to economic analysis of law and our principal emphasis
here, is to explain both the effects and content of law. How will law
affect human behavior? What will individuals’ likely response to
changes in the rules be? Why does law take the form that it does? A
superior understanding of human behavior will improve answers to
such questions.

3

The existing legal literature includes several articles that generally catalogue
behavioral findings and suggest legal issues to which these findings might be
relevant. See Ward Edwards & Detlof Von Winterfeldt, Cognitive Illusions
and Their Implications for the Law, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 225 (1986); Melvin A .
Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 Stan. L.
Rev. 211 (1995); Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailty to
Rational Actors: A Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 ChicagoKent L. Rev. 23 (1989); and Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law,
64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175 (1997). The existing literature also includes a number
of articles that use behavioral insights to analyze specific topics in the
economic analysis of law – primarily the Coase theorem and behavior during
bargaining. These articles are relevant to a few of the issues we discuss below,
and we will draw on them in analyzing those issues.
4
For a similar distinction between positive, prescriptive, and normative
analysis, see David E. Bell, Howard Raiffa & Amos Tversky, Descriptive,
Normative, and Prescriptive Interactions in Decision Making, in Decision
Making (David E. Bell et al. eds. 1988).
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The prescriptive task is to see how law might be used to achieve
specified ends, such as deterring socially undesirable behavior. Much
of conventional economic analysis is concerned with this sort of
question. Explicit consideration of behavioral factors can improve
the prescriptions offered by the analyst. For instance, instead of
focusing only on the actual probability of detecting criminal
behavior in considering whether offenders will be deterred, the
analyst might also want to consider the perceived probability of
detection and how it might differ in systematic and predictable ways
from the actual probability.
The normative task is to assess more broadly the ends of the legal
system. In conventional economic analysis, normative analysis is no
different from prescriptive analysis, since the goal of the legal system
is to maximize “social welfare,” usually measured by people’s revealed
preferences, and prescriptive (in our sense of the term) analysis also
focuses, for the conventional economist, on how to maximize social
welfare. But from the perspective of behavioral economics, the ends
of the legal system are more complex. This is so because people’s
revealed preferences are a less certain ground on which to build.
Obviously issues of paternalism are central here. Behavioral analysis
suggests problems with conventional economic arguments against
paternalism—based on the view that citizens invariably understand
and pursue their own best interests—but also problems with many
forms of government intervention, since bureaucrats are, after all,
behavioral actors too.
Each of these three strands of our project is deeply constructive.
Behavioral economics is a form of economics, and our goal is to
strengthen the predictive and analytic power of law and economics,
not to undermine it. Behavioral economics does not suggest that
behavior is random or impossible to predict; rather it suggests, with
economics, that behavior is systematic and can be modeled. We
attempt to sketch several such models here.
Part I below offers a general framework and provides an
overview of the arguments for enriching the traditional economic
framework. We see this enrichment as similar in spirit to the
increased emphasis on imperfect information in mainstream
economic analysis in recent decades. Just as people often have
imperfect information, which has predictable consequences for

5
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behavior, the departures from the standard conception of the
economic agent also alter behavior in predictable ways.
Parts II and III of the Article involve positive analysis. Part II
examines how a behaviorally-informed law and economics analysis
can help to explain the behavior of human agents insofar as that
behavior is relevant to law. We attempt to explore some puzzles of
human rationality in order to see how law has some of its effects.
Part III shifts to an explanation of existing legal rules and
institutions. We suggest that many features of the legal landscape
that are puzzling from a traditional law and economics perspective
follow naturally from behavioral phenomena.
Part IV of the paper examines prescriptive issues, offering a
series of proposals that might seem puzzling or controversial from a
neoclassical economic perspective but that follow naturally from
taking into account features of actual choice behavior. Our principal
emphasis is on how people respond to information and how this
point bears on the role of law. Finally, Part V is more speculative
and normative. We suggest briefly the main problems—some
familiar and others less so—with the idea that the legal system
ought always to respect informed choice, and also with the idea that
government actors can be relied upon to make better decisions than
citizens. Because of the complexity of these issues, we emphasize
some broad points: the framework that behavioral economics
suggests for thinking about paternalism; the possibility that some
institutions—such as populist government—may be particularly bad
at attempted correction, while others may be better; and the
prospect that some methods of correction (such as those that focus
on debiasing rather than outright coercion) may be acceptable even
if one thinks that consumer error is relatively unlikely.
I. Foundations:
What is “Behavioral Law and Economics”?
In order to identify, in a general way, the defining features of
behavioral law and economics, it is useful first to understand the
defining features of law and economics. As we understand it, this
approach to the law posits that legal rules are best analyzed and
understood in light of standard economic principles. Gary Becker
offers a typical account of those principles: “All human behavior can
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be viewed as involving participants who [1] maximize their utility [2]
from a stable set of preferences and [3] accumulate an optimal
amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets.”5
The task of law and economics is to determine the implications of
such rational maximizing behavior in and out of markets, and for
markets and other institutions insofar as relevant to the law.
Although some of Becker’s particular applications of the economic
approach might be thought of as contentious, the general approach
underlies a wide range of work in the economic analysis of law.6
What then is the task of behavioral law and economics? How
does it differ from standard law and economics? These are the
questions we address below.
A. Homo Economicus and Real People
The task of behavioral law and economics, simply stated, is to
explore the implications of actual (not hypothesized) human
behavior for the law. How do “real people” differ from homo
economicus? We will describe the differences by stressing three
important “bounds” on human behavior, bounds that draw into
question the central ideas of utility maximization, stable preferences,
rational expectations, and optimal processing of information.7
People can be said to display bounded rationality, bounded
willpower, and bounded self-interest.
All three bounds are well documented in the literature of other
social sciences, but they are relatively unexplored in economics. Each
of these bounds represents a significant way in which most people
depart from the standard economic model. While there are instances
in which more than one bound comes into play, at this stage we
think it is best to think of them as separate modeling problems.
Nonetheless, each of the three points to systematic (rather than
random or arbitrary) departures from conventional economic
5

Gary S. Becker, The Economic Approach to Human Behavior 14 (1976).
See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 3 (2d ed.
1997); A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 10 (2d
ed. 1989); Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 3-4 (5th ed. 1998).
7
For a further elaboration of this view, see Richard H. Thaler, Doing
Economics Without Homo Economicus, in Exploring the Foundations of
Research in Economics: How Should Economists Do Economics? 227
(Steven G. Medema & Warren J. Samuels eds., 1996).
6
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models, and thus each of the three bears on generating sound
predictions and prescriptions for law. They also provide the
foundations for new and sometimes quite formal models of
behavior.
1. Bounded rationality
Bounded rationality, a term first introduced by Herbert Simon,
refers to the obvious fact that human cognitive abilities are not
infinite. We have limited computational skills and seriously flawed
memories. People can respond sensibly to these failings; thus it
might be said that people sometimes respond rationally to their own
cognitive limitations, minimizing the sum of decision costs and error
costs. To deal with limited memories we make lists. To deal with
limited brain power and time we use mental short-cuts and rules of
thumb. But even with these remedies, and in some cases because of
these remedies, human behavior differs in systematic ways from that
predicted by the standard economic model of unbounded rationality.
Even when the use of mental short-cuts is rational, it can produce
predictable mistakes. The departures from the rational model can be
divided into two categories: judgment errors and decision making
behavior. Judgment errors are departures from models of rational
expectations and Bayesian forecasting; decision making behavior
reflects departures from expected utility theory.
Judgment errors often arise because of the use of rules of thumb.
As stressed in the pathbreaking work of Daniel Kahneman and
Amos Tversky, for example, rules of thumb such as the availability
heuristic—in which the frequency of some event is estimated by
judging how easy it is to recall other instances of this type (how
“available” such instances are)—lead us to erroneous conclusions.
People tend to conclude, for example, that the probability of an
event (such as a car accident) is greater if they have recently
witnessed an occurrence of that event than if they have not.8 What
is especially important in the work of Kahneman and Tversky is that
it shows that short-cuts and rules of thumb are predictable. While
the heuristics are useful on average (which explains how they
8

Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases, in Judgment Under Uncertainty 3, 11 (Daniel
Kahneman, Paul Slovic, & Amos Tversky eds., 1982).
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become adopted), they lead to errors in particular circumstances.
This means that someone using such a rule of thumb may be
behaving rationally in the sense of economizing on thinking time,
but such a person will nonetheless will make forecasts that are
different from those that emerge from a proper Bayesian model, and
are thus different from those that would emerge from a standard
economic model.
Just as the rational expectations model is not a good description
of actual human judgment, expected utility theory is not a good
description of actual decision making behavior. While the axioms of
expected utility theory characterize rational choice, actual choices
diverge in important ways from this model, as has been known since
the early experiments by Allais and Ellsberg.9 There has been an
explosion of research in recent years trying to develop better formal
models of actual decision making. The model offered by Kahneman
and Tversky, called prospect theory, seems to do a good job of
explaining many features of behavior, and so we draw on that model
(whose main features we summarize in Part IV.B below) here.10
We emphasize that bounded rationality is entirely consistent
with modeling behavior and generating predictions based on a
model, in line with the methodology of conventional economics. As
Kenneth Arrow has explained, “[T]here is no general principle that
prevents the creation of an economic theory based on hypotheses
other than that of rationality… [A]ny coherent theory of reactions
to the stimuli appropriate in an economic context … could in

9

See Colin Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in Handbook of
Experimental Economics 587, 619-20, 622-24 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E.
Roth eds., 1995) (describing Allais paradox); Daniel Ellsberg, Risk,
Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q.J. Econ. 643 (1961).
10
See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decision Under Risk, 47 Econometrica 263 (1979). For a survey of empirical
tests of this and other models, see Camerer, supra note 9, at 626-43. John D.
Hey & Chris Orme, Investigating Generalizations of Expected Utility
Theory Using Experimental Data, 62 Econometrica 1291 (1994), suggest that
expected utility theory performs fairly well, but they do not consider prospect
theory as an alternative. An alternative to prospect theory for modifying
expected utility theory is Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler, Case-Based
Decision Theory, 110 Q.J. Econ. 605 (1995).
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principle lead to a theory of the economy.”11 Arrow’s example here is
habit formation; that behavior, he says, can be incorporated into a
theory by supposing that people choose goods with an eye towards
minimizing changes in their consumption. “Though there is
optimization in this theory, it is different from utility maximization;
for example, if prices and income return to their initial levels after
several alterations, the final bundle purchased will not be the same as
the initial bundle. This theory would strike many lay observers as
plausible, yet it is not rational as economists have used that term.”12
2. Bounded willpower
A second bound on human behavior is bounded willpower. This
term refers to the fact that human beings often take actions that
they know to be in conflict with their own long-term interests.
Most smokers say they would prefer not to smoke, and many pay
money to join a program or obtain a drug that will help them quit.
As with bounded rationality, most healthy people recognize that
they have bounded willpower and take steps to mitigate its effects.
They join a pension plan or Christmas Club to prevent undersaving,
and they don’t keep tempting desserts around the house when trying
to diet. In some cases they may vote for or support governmental
policies, such as social security, to eliminate any temptation to
succumb to the desire for immediate rewards.13 Thus the demand
for and supply of law may reflect people’s understanding of their
own bounded willpower; consider “cooling off” periods for certain
sales and also programs that facilitate or even require saving.
3. Bounded self-interest
Finally, we use the term bounded self-interest to refer to an
important fact about the utility function of most people: people
generally care, or act as if they care, about others, even strangers, in
some circumstances. (Thus, we are not questioning here the idea of
utility maximization, but rather the common assumptions about
K enneth J. Arrow, Rationality of Self and Others in an Economic System,
in Rational Choice: The Contrast Between Economics and Psychology 201,
202 (Robin M. Hogarth & Melvin W. Reder eds., 1987).
12
Id.
13
See Deborah Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1275
(1991).
11

Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics

10

what that entails.) Our notion is distinct from simple altruism,
which conventional economics has emphasized in areas such as
bequest decisions. Self-interest is bounded in a much broader range
of settings than conventional economics assumes, and the bound
operates in ways different from what the conventional
understanding suggests. In many market and bargaining settings (as
opposed to nonmarket settings such as bequest decisions), people
care about being treated fairly and want to treat others fairly if those
others are themselves behaving fairly. As a result of these concerns,
the agents in a behavioral economic model are both nicer and (when
they are not treated fairly) more spiteful than the agents postulated
by neoclassical theory. Formal models have been used to show how
people deal with both fairness and unfairness; we will draw on those
models here.
4. Applications
The goal of this Article is to show how the incorporation of
these understandings of human behavior bears on the actual
operation and possible improvement of the legal system. The
Appendix summarizes some key features of each of the three bounds
on human behavior just described. It also indicates the law and
economics issues we analyze under each category.
When is each bound likely to come into play? Any general
statement will necessarily be incomplete, but some broad
generalizations can be offered. First, bounded rationality in the form
of judgment errors will come into play whenever actors in the legal
system are called upon to assess the probability of an uncertain event.
We discuss many examples below, including environmental
legislation (Part III.C), negligence determinations (Part IV.A), and
risk assessments (Parts IV.B and V.A). Second, bounded rationality
as it relates to decision making behavior will come into play
whenever actors are valuing outcomes; a prominent example here is
loss aversion and its corollary, the endowment effect, which we
discuss in connection with bargaining behavior (Part II.B),
mandatory contract terms (Part II.D), prior restraints on speech
(Part III.B), and risk assessments (Parts IV.B and V.A). Bounded
willpower is most relevant when decisions have consequences over
time; our example is criminal behavior (Part IV.C), where the
benefits are generally immediate and the costs deferred. Finally,
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bounded self-interest (as we use the term) is relevant primarily in
situations in which one party has deviated substantially from the
usual or ordinary conduct under the circumstances; in such
circumstances the other party will often be willing to incur financial
costs to punish the “unfair” behavior. Our applications here include
bargaining behavior (Part II.B) and laws banning market
transactions (Part III.A).
The three bounds we describe do not (at least as we characterize
them here) constitute a full description of human behavior in all its
complexity. Although we will have more to say about parsimony
below, we will say for now that our goal is to sketch out an approach
spare enough to generate predictions across a range of contexts, but
not so spare that its predictions about behavior are often incorrect (as
we will suggest is the case with conventional law and economics in
some contexts). Many interesting features of behavior not
emphasized by our framework may also play a role in explaining
specific forms of behavior relevant to law.14 And it can be
illuminating to attend in some detail to the role of social norms in
various contexts15 and to the place of shame, pride, and selfesteem,16 especially insofar as an understanding of these variables
helps give content to people’s utility functions in ways that bear on
the uses of law. Our principal purpose here, however, is to provide
predictions, rather than to give full descriptions of individual
motivations and self-understandings, and we will refer to these
variables only occasionally and in passing.
B. Testable Predictions
Behavioral and conventional law and economics do not differ
solely in their assumptions about human behavior. They also differ,
in testable ways, in their predictions about how law (as well as other
14

See, e.g., Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to
Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 107
(1994) (effects of “equity seeking” and “reactive devaluation” on settlement
behavior); Mark Kelman, Yuval Rottenstreich, & Amos Tversky, ContextDependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. Legal Stud. 287 (1996) (effects of
“compromise” and “contrast” behavior on jury decision making).
15
See Symposium, 114 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1643 (1996).
16
See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 943 (1995).
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forces) affects behavior. To make more concrete these differences,
consider the three “fundamental propositions of economics” set
forth by Richard Posner in his Economic Analysis of Law,17 in a
discussion that is, on these points, quite conventional. To what
extent would an account based on behavioral law and economics
offer different “fundamental propositions”?
The first fundamental proposition for the conventional
approach is downward-sloping demand: people demand less of a
good when its price rises.18 This prediction is, of course, valid. There
are few if any documented cases of Giffen goods. However,
confirmation of this prediction does not suggest that people are
optimizing. As Becker has shown, even people choosing at random
will tend to consume less of a good when its price goes up as long as
they have limited resources.19 This behavior has also been
demonstrated on laboratory rats.20 Thus, evidence of downwardsloping demand is not evidence in support of optimizing models.
The second fundamental proposition of conventional law and
economics concerns the nature of costs: “[c]ost to the economist is
‘opportunity cost,’” and “‘sunk’ (incurred) costs do not affect
decisions on prices and quantity.”21 Thus, according to traditional
analysis, decision makers will equate opportunity costs (costs incurred
by foregoing opportunities—say, the opportunity to sell one’s
possessions) to out-of-pocket costs (such as costs incurred in buying
possessions); and they will ignore sunk costs (costs that cannot be
recovered, such as nonrefundable tickets). But each of these
propositions is a frequent source of predictive failures. The equality
of opportunity costs and out-of-pocket costs implies that, in the
absence of important wealth effects, buying prices are roughly equal
to selling prices. This is frequently violated, as is well known. Many
people holding tickets to a popular sporting event such as the Super
Bowl would be unwilling to buy tickets at the market price (say
$1000) yet would also be unwilling to sell at this price. Indeed,
17

Posner, supra note 6.
Id. at 4.
19
Gary S. Becker, Irrational Behavior and Economic Theory, 70 J. Pol.
Econ. 1 (1962).
20
John H. Kagel, Raymond C. Battalio, & Leonard Green, Economic
Choice Theory: An Experimental Analysis of Animal Behavior 51 (1995).
21
Posner, supra note 6, at 6, 7.
18
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estimates of the ratio of selling prices to buying prices are often at
least two to one, yet the size of the transaction makes it implausible
in these studies that wealth effects explain the difference.22 As
described below, these results are just what behavioral analysis
suggests. The traditional assumption about sunk costs also generates
invalid predictions. Here is one: A theater patron who ignores sunk
costs would not take into account the cost of a pre-paid season pass
in deciding whether to “rouse [him]self to go out” on the evening of
a particular performance;23 but in a study of theater patrons, some of
whom were randomly assigned to receive discounted prices, the
patrons who received discounts were found to attend significantly
fewer performances than those who did not receive discounts.24
Thus, sunk costs mattered. Again, the standard prediction proved
invalid.
The third fundamental proposition of conventional law and
economics is that “resources tend to gravitate toward their most
valuable uses” as markets drive out any unexploited profit
opportunities.25 When combined with the notion that opportunity
and out-of-pocket costs are equated (see proposition two), this yields
the Coase theorem—the idea that initial assignments of
entitlements will not affect the ultimate allocation of resources so
long as transaction costs are zero.26 Many economists and
economically oriented lawyers think of the Coase theorem as a
tautology; if there were really no transactions costs (and no wealth
effects), and if an alternative allocation of resources would make
some agents better off and none worse off, then of course the agents
would move to that allocation. Careful empirical study, however,
shows that the Coase theorem is not a tautology; indeed, it can lead
to inaccurate predictions.27 That is, even when transactions costs
22

See Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, & Richard H. Thaler,
Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J.
Pol. Econ. 1325, 1327 (1990) (summarizing studies).
23
Robert Nozick, The Nature of Rationality 22 (1993).
24
Hal R. Arkes & Catherine Blumer, The Psychology of Sunk Cost, 35(1)
Organizational Behav. & Human Decision Processes 124 (1985).
25
Posner, supra note 6, at 11.
26
Id. at 8; Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & Econ. 1
(1960).
27
Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, supra note 22, at 1329-42.
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and wealth effects are known to be zero, initial entitlements alter
the final allocation of resources. These results are predicted by
behavioral economics, which emphasizes the difference between
opportunity and out-of-pocket costs.
Consider the following set of experiments conducted to test the
Coase theorem;28 let us offer an interpretation geared to the
particular context of economic analysis of law. The subjects were 44
students taking an advanced undergraduate course in law and
economics at Cornell University. Half the students were endowed
with tokens. Each student was assigned a token value, the price at
which a token could be redeemed for cash at the end of the
experiment; these assigned values induce supply and demand curves
for the tokens. Markets were conducted for tokens. Those without
tokens could buy one, while those with tokens could sell. Those
with tokens should (and do) sell their tokens if offered more than
their assigned value; those without tokens should (and do) buy
tokens if they can get one at a price below their assigned value.
These token markets are a complete victory of economic theory.
The equilibrium price was always exactly what the theory would
predict, and the tokens did in fact flow to those who valued them
most.
However, life is generally not about tokens redeemable for cash.
Thus another experiment was conducted, identical to the first except
that now half the students were given Cornell coffee mugs instead
of tokens. Here behavioral analysis generates a prediction distinct
from standard economic analysis: Because people do not equate
opportunity and out-of-pocket costs for goods whose values are not
exogenously defined (as they were in the case of the tokens), those
endowed with mugs should be reluctant to part with them even at
prices they would not have considered paying to acquire a mug had
they not received one. Was this prediction correct? Again markets
were conducted and mugs bought and sold. However, unlike the
case of the tokens, the assignment of property rights had a
pronounced effect on the final allocation of mugs. The students
who were assigned mugs had a strong tendency to keep them.
Whereas the Coase theorem would have predicted that about half
the mugs would trade (since transactions costs had been shown to
28

See id.
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be essentially zero in the token experiments and mugs were
randomly distributed), instead only fifteen percent of the mugs
traded. And, those who were endowed with mugs asked more than
twice as much to give up a mug than those who didn’t get a mug
were willing to pay. This result did not change if the markets were
repeated. This effect is generally referred to as the “endowment
effect”; it is a manifestation of the broader phenomenon of “loss
aversion”—the idea that losses are weighted more heavily than
gains—which in turn is a central building block of Kahneman and
Tversky’s prospect theory.
What are we to make of these findings? There are at least three
important lessons. First, markets are indeed robust institutions. Even
naive subjects participating at low stakes produce outcomes
indistinguishable from those predicted by the theory when trading
for tokens. Second, when agents must determine their own values (as
with the mugs), outcomes can diverge substantially from those
predicted by economic theory. Third, these departures will not be
obvious outside an experiment, even when they exist and have
considerable importance. That is, even in the mugs markets, there
was trading; there was just not as much trading as the theory would
predict. These lessons can be applied to other markets; we offer
some examples below.
The foregoing discussion illustrates the point with which we
began this section: the difference between conventional and
behavioral law and economics is not just a difference in the validity
of the assumptions about human behavior. While the assumptions
of unbounded rationality, willpower, and self-interest are unrealistic,
the force of behavioral economics comes from the difference in its
predictions (for example, fewer trades for mugs than for tokens). In
this sense, our analysis is consistent with the precept originally
proposed by Milton Friedman: economics should not be judged on
whether the assumptions are realistic or valid, but rather on the
quality of its predictions.29 We share this view; as we have
emphasized, our principal interest in this Article is predictive in
character. A behavioral analysis would be of much less interest if
conventional economic models did a satisfactory job of predicting
29

Milton Friedman, The Methodology of Positive Economics, in Essays i n
Positive Economics 3 (Milton Friedman ed., 1953)
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the behavior of agents insofar as relevant to law. Unfortunately, they
often do not. Our focus on predictive success means that we
generally do not emphasize why people tend to exhibit bounded
rationality, willpower, and self-interest; this is a fascinating subject
on which there is much to be said, but, in light of our predictive
focus, we do not give it heavy emphasis here.
C. Partial and Ambiguous Successes of Conventional Economics
What of all the well-known successes of conventional
economics? Do they show that predictions about law based on the
conventional assumptions tend to work? Consider some [well-worn
deleted] examples of the successes: (1) the inverse correlation
between price ceilings and queues; (2) the inverse correlation
between rent control and the stock of housing; (3) the positive
correlation in financial markets between risk and expected return;
(4) the relation between futures prices and spot-market prices.30 The
problem with the first three examples is that, as with tests of
downward-sloping demand curves, they are quite undemanding;
they ask simply whether the theory gets the direction of the effect
right—and it does. But this is not a complete vindication of the
theory, for the theory may misstate the magnitude of the effect.
Consider (3), the positive relation between risk and return in
financial markets. As predicted by this theory, stocks (equities) earn
higher returns (on average) than do riskless assets such as treasury
bills. But what can we say about the magnitude? Is this difference in
return about what the theory would predict? This is precisely the
question posed asked by Rajnish Mehra and Edward Prescott in
their well-known paper on the “equity premium puzzle.”31 The
equity premium is the difference in returns between equities and
riskless assets. In the United States, the equity premium has been
roughly 6 percent over the past 70 years. This implies that a dollar
invested in stocks in 1926 would at the end of 1997 be worth over
$1800, while a dollar invested in treasury bills would have
accumulated to less than $15. This difference is remarkably large.
Mehra and Prescott therefore ask whether it can possibly be
30

Posner, supra note 6, at 18.
Rajnish Mehra & Edward C. Prescott, The Equity Premium: A Puzzle,
15 J. Monetary Econ. 145 (1985).
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explained by investor risk aversion. They conclude that it cannot.
That is, no plausible value of risk aversion could explain such a big
difference. Although the theory gets the sign right in this case, the
magnitude of the effect suggests that the theory is false. (And note
that arbitrage, which we discuss just below, would not be expected
to eliminate the equity premium.32)
Example (4) above, the relation between spot and futures prices,
does better on magnitudes. Spot and futures prices are very closely
related. However, this case is special in several respects. First,
arbitrage is possible. If spot and futures prices get out of line, then
investors can make sure profits by buying the contract that is too
cheap and selling the one that it too expensive. Second, this is a
domain where most of the activity is undertaken by professionals
who will quickly lose their money and jobs if they make frequent
errors. Third, the markets in which these professionals operate offer
frequent opportunities for learning. Under these circumstances,
markets tend to work very well,33 though not perfectly.34 Essentially,
these conditions render agents who do not conform to the standard
economic assumptions irrelevant.
So, in some (fairly unusual) circumstances, such as futures
trading, market forces are strong enough to make the three “bounds”
irrelevant for predictive purposes. The point is important; it suggests
that while human beings often display bounded rationality,
willpower, and self-interest, markets can sometimes lead to behavior
consistent with conventional economic assumptions. Then the
question becomes when, exactly, do market forces make it reasonable
to assume that people behave in accordance with those assumptions?
What circumstances apply to most of the domains in which law and
32

See Robert Vishny & Andrei Shleifer, Limits of Arbitrage, 52 J. of Fin. 35
(1996); Jeffrey Pontiff, Costly Arbitrage: Evidence from Closed-End Funds,”
111 Q. J. Econ. 1135 (1996).
33
See Thomas Russell & Richard H. Thaler, The Relevance of Quasi
Rational Behavior in Competitive Markets, in Richard H. Thaler, Quasi
Rational Economics 239, 244-49 (1991).
34
For example, in a rational market, the relation between spot and futures
contracts for foreign exchange are good forecasts of movements in exchange
rates. In fact, these forecasts are systematically biased. See Kenneth A. Froot &
Richard H. Thaler, Foreign Exchange, in Richard H. Thaler, The Winner’s
Curse 182 (1992).
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economics is applied? In this regard it is instructive to compare the
market for futures contracts with the market for criminal activity.
Consider the proposition that a potential criminal will commit some
crime if the expected gains from the crime exceed its expected
costs.35 Suppose a criminal mistakenly thinks that the expected gains
outweigh the expected costs, when in fact the opposite is true. First
notice that no arbitrage will be possible in this situation. If someone
is unfortunate enough to commit a crime with a negative expected
value, then there is no way for anyone else to profit directly from his
behavior. Outside of financial markets (and not always there), those
who engage in low-payoff activities lose utility but do not create
profit opportunities for others. Nor do they typically disappear from
the market. (Even poorly run firms can survive for many years;
consider GM.) Being a bad criminal is rarely fatal, and except
possibly for organized crime, there is little opportunity for “hostile
takeovers.” Finally, the decision to enter a life of crime is not one
that is made repeatedly with many opportunities to learn. Once a
teenager has dropped out of high school to become a drug dealer, it
is difficult to switch to dentistry.
Since law and economics is frequently applied to criminal
behavior, the above argument is obviously germane. However, we
think that the same analysis applies to many of the domains in
which law and economics has been used. In fact, economic analysis
of law seems to be a branch of economics in which the limits of
arbitrage are particularly powerful, so special care should be taken not
to push the standard economic model too far.
This is by no means to say that conventional law and economics
has had no victories. One cannot look at the current state of
antitrust law, or the use of market-based regulation in
environmental law (to name just two of many examples), without
acknowledging the important advances produced through using the
conventional approach. Often this approach points in the right
directions and identifies flaws in non-economic reasoning. Many
advances in the positive and prescriptive understanding of law have
come from the conventional assumptions. Attention to incentive
effects can often reveal a great deal. (Thus, those who would argue
35
See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of
Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1232, 1235 (1985).
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that rent control helps tenants must contend with the obvious longrun supply effects of such laws.)
The project of behavioral law and economics, as we see it, is to
take the core insights and successes of economics and build upon
them by making more realistic assumptions about human behavior.
We wish to retain the power of the economist’s approach to social
science while offering a better description of the behavior of the
agents in society and the economy. Behavioral law and economics,
in short, offers the potential to be law and economics with a higher
“R2 ”—that is, greater power to explain the observed data. We will try
to highlight some of that potential (and suggest cases where it has
been realized) in this Article.
D. Parsimony
A possible objection to our approach is that conventional
economics has the advantage of simplicity and parsimony. At
least—the objection goes—it provides a theory. By contrast, a
behavioral perspective offers a more complicated and unruly picture
of human behavior, and perhaps that picture will make predictions
harder to make, precisely because it is more complicated and unruly.
Everything can be explained in an ex post fashion—some tool will
be found that is up to the task—but the elegance, generalizability,
and predictive power of the economic method will be lost. Shouldn’t
analysts proceed with simple tools? We offer two responses: First,
simplicity and parsimony are indeed beneficial; it would be highly
desirable to come up with a model of behavior that is both simple
and right. But conventional economics is not in this position, for its
predictions are often wrong. We will encounter many examples in
addition to those already discussed.
Second, to the extent conventional economics achieves
parsimony, it often does so at the expense of any real predictive
power. Its goal is to provide a unitary theory of behavior, a goal
which may be impossible to achieve. By itself the notion of
“rationality” (the centerpiece of traditional analysis) is not a theory;
to generate predictions it must be more fully specified, often through
the use of auxiliary assumptions.36 Indeed, the term “rationality” is
highly ambiguous and can be used to mean many things. A person
36
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might be deemed rational if her behavior (1) conforms to the axioms
of expected utility theory; (2) is responsive to incentives, that is, if
she changes her behavior when the costs and benefits are altered; (3)
is internally consistent; (4) promotes her own welfare; (5) is effective
in achieving her goals, whatever the relationship between those
goals and her actual welfare. We observe departures from most of
these definitions; thus, with respect to (1), departures from expected
utility theory have been documented for nearly fifty years, and the
quasi rational prospect theory seems to predict behavior better.37
With respect to (4) and (5), people’s decisions sometimes do not
promote their welfare or help them to achieve their own goals; and
with respect to (3), behavioral research shows that people sometimes
behave in an inconsistent manner.38 Many of our examples will thus
show that people are frequently not rational if the term is
understood to mean (1), (3), (4), or (5). As for (2), without some
specification of what counts as a cost and a benefit, the idea of
responsiveness to incentives is empty. If rationality is used to mean
simply that people “choose” what they “prefer,”39 then the notion of
rationality offers few restrictions on behavior.40 The person who
drinks castor oil as often as possible is rational because she happens
to love castor oil. Other self-destructive behavior (drug addiction,
suicide, etc.) can be explained on similar grounds. It is not even clear
on this view whether rationality is intended as a definition of
“preference” or as a prediction.41
If such this notion of rationality allowed for good predictions,
then there would be no reason for complaint; the problem, however,
is that so high a degree of flexibility leaves the theory with few a
priori restrictions. A theory with infinite degrees of freedom is no
37

See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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problems. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 Colum.
L. Rev. 903, 932-38 (1996).
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theory at all. For example, consider whether it is a paradox (as many
economists think) if many people vote. If it is a paradox, so much
the worse for the rationality assumption; if it is not a paradox, what
does the assumption predict? Does it merely predict that people will
respond to changes in conditions − for example, fewer people will
vote when it is snowing? If so, the prediction is not bad, but surely it
would be possible to say, after an unusually large vote amidst the
storm, that more people voted simply because voting seemed
especially valiant in those circumstances (so much for predictions
based on this form of rationality). Conventional economics
sometimes turns to stronger forms of rationality in response, and
those forms provide stronger predictions in some cases; but those
predictions are often inaccurate, as described above and as illustrated
by the examples considered below.
We believe that a behavioral approach imposes discipline to
economic theorizing because assumptions cannot be imported at
will. In a behavioral approach, assumptions about behavior should
accord with empirically validated descriptions of actual behavior.
Thus, for example, in the case of “fairness,” specifically defined and
empirically verified patterns of behavior are used to generate
predictions in new contexts. (“Fairness” is not, on this view, simply a
catch-all to explain any observed behavior.) This is the approach we
advocate for economic analysis of law. This approach, we believe,
produces a better understanding of law and a better set of predictions
about its effects.
We now turn to positive, prescriptive, and normative issues. Our
purpose is not to settle all of them, but to show the promise of
behavioral economics in casting light on a wide range of questions.
A great deal of work would be necessary to justify authoritative
judgments on most of these questions. What follows should be
taken partly as a proposal, perhaps in the spirit of the early economic
analysis of law, for a research agenda to be carried out with a new set
of tools.
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II. Behavior of Agents
A. The Ultimatum Game
1. The Game and Its Sunk-Cost Variation
We begin with bounded self-interest, the third bound described
above. A useful first example of this bound is agents’ behavior in a
very simple bargaining game called the ultimatum game. In this
game, one player, the Proposer, is asked to propose an allocation of a
sum of money between herself and the other player, the Responder.
The Responder then has a choice. He can either accept the amount
offered to him by the Proposer, leaving the rest to the Proposer, or
he can reject the offer, in which case both players get nothing.
Neither player knows the identity of his or her counterpart, and the
players will play against each other only once, so reputations and
future retaliation are eliminated as factors.
Economic theory has a simple prediction about this game. The
Proposer will offer the smallest unit of currency available, say a
penny, and the Responder will accept, since a penny is better than
nothing. This turns out to be a very bad prediction about how the
game is actually played. Responders typically reject offers of less than
twenty percent of the total amount available; the average minimum
amount that Responders say they would accept is between twenty
and thirty percent of that sum.42 Responders are thus willing to
punish unfair behavior, even at a financial cost to themselves. This is
a form of bounded self-interest. And it seems to be expected and
anticipated by Proposers; they typically offer a substantial portion of
the sum to be divided—ordinarily forty to fifty percent.43
Economists often worry that the results of this type of
experiment are sensitive to the way in which the experiment was
conducted. What would happen if the stakes were raised
substantially, or the game was repeated several times to allow
42

Werner Guth, Rolf Schmittberger, & Bernd Schwarze, An Experimental
Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. Econ. Behav. & Organization 379
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learning? In this case, we know the answer. To a first
approximation, neither of these factors changes the results in any
important way. Raising the stakes from $10 per pair to $100, or even
to several months’ income (in a poor country) has little effect; the
same is true of repeating the game ten times with different
partners.44 (Of course, at some point raising the stakes would matter;
probably few people would turn down an offer of five percent of
$1,000,000.) We do not see behavior moving toward the prediction
of standard economic theory.
Thus, the factors that many economists thought would change
the outcome of the game did not. But, as we learned in a study
conducted for this paper, a factor that economic theory predicts will
not have an effect, namely the introduction of a sunk cost, does have
an effect. As noted above, economics predicts that decision makers
will ignore sunk costs in making their choices (see fundamental
proposition two above); but in fact decision makers often do not
behave in this way. Do sunk costs alter behavior in the ultimatum
game? To find out, we asked classroom volunteers to bring
$5—what would become a sunk cost for them—to class. Students
were given a form asking them how they would play both roles in
an ultimatum game in which the $10 to be divided was contributed
half by the Proposer and half by the Responder. They were told that
their role would be determined by chance, so they had to decide first
what offer to make if they were chosen to be a Proposer and then
what minimum offer they would be willing to accept if they were in
the role of the Responder.45 We also ran a version of the standard
ultimatum game (without sunk costs by the students) as a control.
44
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Although economic theory says that the sunk-cost variation of
the ultimatum game will have no effect on behavior (since the $5
collected from each student is a sunk cost and should therefore be
ignored), we predicted that in this domain sunk costs would matter.
In particular, we anticipated that Responders would feel that they
had an “entitlement” to the $5 they had contributed to the
experiment and would therefore be reluctant to accept less. This is
precisely what we found. In the original version of the game, when
the $10 to be divided was provided to subjects by the experimenter,
the average minimum amount demanded by Responders was $1.94.
In the sunk-cost version, where the students each paid $5 to
participate, the average demand was $3.21 for a group of MIT
MBA students, $3.73 for a group of University of Chicago MBA
students, and $3.35 for a group of UC Law students. Each of these
means is significantly different from the control value of $1.94
under any conventional measure of statistical significance. Looking
past means, 61% of the MIT students demanded at least $4.00 and
32% demanded a full refund of their $5.00. For UC MBA students,
67% demanded at least $4.00 and 40% demanded $5.00. The UC
Law students were slightly less extreme: 47% demanded at least
$4.00 and 23% demanded $5.00.
Note that our emphasis here, as well as in the ordinary
ultimatum game, is on the fairness behavior of Responders, not on
affirmative concerns for fairness on the part of Proposers. (As noted
above, their behavior appears fully consistent with financially
maximizing responses to Responders’ fairness behavior; other
experimental results support this conclusion.46) We do know,
however, that in other contexts people appear to display affirmative
concerns for fairness.47
The fairness results obtained in various experimental settings,
such as the ultimatum game, cannot be explained on grounds of
reputation. The parties are interacting anonymously and in a oneshot fashion. Of course, many real-world situations may reflect a
combination of reputational and fairness factors. Thus, for example,
46
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firms that violate the norms of an industry are ostracized, presumably
at some cost to the remaining firms, partly because of a rational fear
that the offending party might be untrustworthy, and partly because
of a spiteful tendency to punish unmannerly behavior, even when
the punishment is costly to administer (as when Responders turn
down small offers). Many of Robert Ellickson’s examples in his
pathbreaking book, Order Without Law, have precisely this flavor.48
Often it is impossible to disentangle the two effects. The value of
the experimental method is precisely that situations can be created in
which the reputational factor is absent (because the transactions are
anonymous and one-shot), allowing one to test directly for fairness.
The ultimatum game results show that we find it: people will often
behave in accordance with fairness considerations even when it is
against their financial self interest and no one will know. Thus, for
instance, most people leave tips in out-of-town restaurants that they
never plan to visit again.
2. Fairness, Acrimony, and Scruples
(a) Theoretical considerations
How can economic analysis be enriched to incorporate the
behavior observed in the ultimatum game and its sunk-cost variant?
As we have indicated, the first step is to relax the assumption,
common to most economic theorizing, of “unbounded self-interest.”
This assumption implies that Proposers should offer the smallest
sum possible, and Responders should accept. An alternative view is
offered in the following account: “In the rural areas around Ithaca it
is common for farmers to put some fresh produce on a table by the
side of the road. There is a cash box on the table, and customers are
expected to put money in the box in return for the vegetables they
take. The box has just a small slit, so money can only be put in, not
taken out. Also, the box is attached to the table, so no one can
(easily) make off with the money. We think that the farmers who
use this system have just about the right model of human nature.
They feel that enough people will volunteer to pay for the fresh corn

48
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to make it worthwhile to put it out there. The farmers also know
that if it were easy to take the money, someone would.”49
We emphasize that this is not a story of simple altruism. Such
altruism is sometimes recognized in conventional economics.50 Our
account, in contrast, is a more complicated story of reciprocal
fairness. A concern for fairness is part of most agents’ utility
function. The ultimatum game results, like the behavior of the
Ithaca shoppers, cannot readily be explained on grounds of simple
altruism. First of all, the games are played between anonymous
strangers. What reason is there to believe that these people care
about one another? (Most of us give little of our wealth to
anonymous strangers whom we have no reason to believe are any
worse off than we are. Similarly, most people driving by a farm do
not pull over and stuff two dollars through the mail slot, even in
Ithaca. Fairness behavior is probably reciprocal.) Second, we observe
not only apparently “nice” behavior (generous offers) but also
“spiteful” behavior (Responders turning down small offers at
substantial cost to the Proposers). In this game, people appear
simultaneously nicer and more spiteful than conventional
assumptions predict.
It is also no answer to say that the results of the ultimatum game
are readily predictable on the conventional model on the ground
that pride and self-conception are part of players’ utility functions.
The problem with this view is not that it is false but that it allows ad
hoc, ex post additions to the utility function, in such a way as to
deprive the conventional model of the ability to make any
predictions; the goal of the behavioral approach is to go back and
forth between data and theory to generate predictions that will
generalize.
The sort of balanced conception of human nature suggested by
the ultimatum game results and the practices of farmers in Ithaca
need not be informal or ad hoc. It is possible to incorporate material
and non-material motives, such as the desire to be fair (to those who
49
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have been fair) and also to be spiteful (to those who have not been
fair). An elegant formal treatment is offered by Matthew Rabin in a
model of fairness.51 Rabin’s framework incorporates three stylized
facts about behavior. Stated simply and non-formally:
(1) People are willing to sacrifice their own material well-being
to help those who are being kind.
(2) People are willing to sacrifice their own material well-being
to punish those who are being unkind.
(3) Both motivations (1) and (2) have greater effect on behavior
as the material cost of sacrificing becomes smaller.52
Rabin shows how these assumptions about behavior can explain
the behavior observed in the ultimatum game as well as other games
of cooperation such as the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Related work,
bearing on the appropriate role of law, has shown the role of such
behavior in helping to produce norms that solve collective action
problems.53
Rabin’s theory can be viewed as a theory of manners and
principles. Generalizing from Rabin’s treatment, we might say that
people can be understood as having preferences for (a) their own
material payoffs and (b) those of some others they know well, and in
addition they have preferences about (c) the well-being of some
strangers whose interests are at stake, (d) their own reputation, and
(e) what kind of person they wish to be. A person’s willingness to
cooperate or to help others can be seen as a function of these
variables. The last factor is important and especially easy to overlook;
the desire to think of yourself as an honest, principled person helps
explain why most of us (though not all) do leave tips in strange
restaurants, and would leave money in the box at the road-side
stand. As Rabin says, people are willing to sacrifice their own
material well-being to help those who are being or have been kind.
Of course, these desires compete with others in a world of scarce
51
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resources. We don’t recommend that Mercedes dealers adopt the
road-side stand selling technique.
Thus behavioral economic agents have manners and scruples
that can lead them to be “nice” in some settings. But, as we observe
in the ultimatum game, people can also be provoked to be spiteful.
Sometimes the fact that another person will lose, in a material or
other sense, is a benefit to the agent; these are the conditions for
spite. An agent may calculate that the costs of benefiting another
person argue strongly against a deal, even if the agent would benefit
materially. Thus Responders who receive (relatively) small offers are
willing to decline them in order to punish the rude Proposers who
tried to grab too much for themselves, even when the small offer is a
substantial amount of money. Notice that this spiteful behavior is
also “principled”: people are willing to pay to punish someone who
has been unfair. This is the same behavior that drives boycotts,
where consumers refrain from buying something they normally
enjoy in order to punish an offending party. Conventional
economics has sometimes recognized such behavior, but it has
received little attention in law and economics, where, unfortunately,
it may often be quite relevant.54
Spiteful behavior is common under conditions of acrimony, such
as during a fight or argument. Under these circumstances, even
married couples will say and do things to hurt the other party; under
bad conditions, the hurting, material or otherwise, is part of the
agent’s gain. A loss to another is a gain to oneself; even the idea of
thinking of oneself as a certain kind of person (not a doormat or a
dupe) can lead in the direction of inflicting losses. (Concern with
not establishing a reputation as a doormat or a dupe may also play a
role.) This is of course the converse of circumstances of cooperative
behavior. Unfortunately, acrimony is particularly prevalent in many
legal settings, before, during, and after litigation. Much protracted
litigation—cases that fail to settle early and amicably—may arise
precisely because the two sides were unable to deal with matters in a
more friendly manner. (Divorces that end up in court are, almost by
definition, acrimonious.) We suspect that spiteful behavior is
frequently observed in conditions of acrimony even when
54
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reputational concerns are unimportant; for example, we think that
the average contestant in a divorce case that ends up in court would
be likely, in the role of Responder in the ultimatum game playing
against his soon-to-be-ex-spouse, to reject low offers, not wanting
the Proposer to benefit greatly.55
(b) What is “fair”?
Absent acrimony, spiteful behavior—such as rejection of small
offers in the ultimatum game—is typically observed in situations
where one party has violated a perceived “norm of fairness.” This
raises an obvious question: What is “fair”? In the ultimatum game,
most people regard an offer of, say, a penny to the Responder as
“unfair.” This perception is an illustration of a more general pattern:
people judge outcomes to be “unfair” if they depart substantially from
the terms of a “reference transaction”—a transaction that defines the
benchmark for the parties’ interactions.56 When the interactions are
between bargainers dividing a sum of money to which neither is
more entitled than the other (and this is common knowledge), the
“reference transaction” is something like an equal split; substantial
departures are viewed as unfair and, accordingly, punished by
Responders. If parties are bargaining over the division of money and
both have reason to view one side as more entitled than the other,
then the “reference transaction” is a split that favors the moreentitled party.57 And if the parties are a consumer and a firm in the
market, the “reference transaction” is a transaction on the usual
terms for the item in question.58 We will have much more to say
about this last context in Part III below. For now our goal is simply
to offer our general definition of what is “fair” and to make clear
that we do not view the term as a vague and ill-defined catch-all.
55

Cf. Robert Gibbons & Leaf Van Bonen, Multiple Selves in the Prisoners’
Dilemma (working paper, Cornell University, 1998) (subjects more like to
engage in cooperative behavior in games when they have a positive impression
of their opponent than when they have a negative impression).
56
Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch, & Richard H. Thaler, Fairness as a
Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 Am. Econ.
Rev. 728 (1986).
57
Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew Spitzer, Entitlements, Rights, and
Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subjects’ Concepts of Distributive
Justice, 14 J. Legal Stud. 259 (1985).
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Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, supra note 56.
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Rather, we view it as having a reasonably well-specified meaning
that can generate useful predictions across a range of contexts.59
(c) Norms
Norms. Thus far the discussion has emphasized fairness, and we
will stress this factor throughout. But fairness-related norms are a
subset of a large category of norms that govern behavior, and that
can operate as “taxes” or “subsidies.” An analysis like that in Part
II(A)(2)(a) above could be undertaken for many decisions in which
people care not only about material self-interest but also about their
reputations and their self-conception—for example, through
purchasing books, suits, vacation spots, or through smoking,
recycling, discriminating on the basis of race and sex, or through
choosing friends, restaurants, and automobiles. A better
understanding of the ingredients of individual utility could help a
great deal with both the positive and prescriptive analysis of law. For
example, it might help us understand more about the massive
changes in behavior that have followed largely unenforced bans on
smoking in public places—the phenomenon of “compliance without
enforcement.”60
B. Bargaining Around Court Orders
1. Coasian Prediction
As noted above, an important aspect of law and economics is
the Coase theorem, which says that the assignment of a legal
entitlement will not influence the ultimate allocation of that
entitlement when transaction costs and wealth effects are zero. A
straightforward application of this idea is that when a court enters a
judgment, whether in the form of an injunction or a damage award,
the parties are likely to bargain to a different outcome if that
59

For a recent effort to incorporate a more general notion of “fairness” into
the economic analysis of tort law, see Henrik Lando, An Attempt to
Incorporate Fairness into an Economic Model of Tort Law, 17 Int’l Rev. L. &
Econ. 575 (1997). The relevant “fairness” notions there may be somewhat
more “ad hoc,” as Henrik ultimately concludes, id. at 582, because, in contrast
to the more market-oriented contexts we consider, there is no clear “reference
transaction” in the tort context.
60
See Compliance Without Enforcement, in Smoking Policy (Robert Rabin
and Stephen Sugarman, eds., 1993).
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outcome is preferable to what the court did and the transaction costs
and wealth effects are small. (Thus, for instance, if the court enters a
prohibitively high damage award but the activity in question is
efficient, the parties should bargain for a lower damage level.)61 To
whom an entitlement is allocated after litigation, and how it is
protected (by a property rule or a liability rule), are irrelevant to the
ultimate allocation of the entitlement in these circumstances.
2. Behavioral Analysis
Influenced by behavioral economics, many legal commentators
have observed that in light of the endowment effect described in
Part I (an aspect of prospect theory, and thus an instance of
bounded rationality), the assignment of a legal entitlement may well
affect the outcome of bargaining, even when transaction costs (as
conventionally defined) and wealth effects are zero.62 This
conclusion is suggested by the mugs experiments described in Part I,
as well as by a substantial body of other evidence on the endowment
effect.63 The mugs results were obtained in circumstances that were
the most favorable for the predictions of the conventional theory to
hold. Transactions costs were zero and the sort of emotional
attachments that can grow over time in the real world were absent.
Mug owners had become mug owners just minutes before the
markets were run. Compare that with a homeowner who has been
endowed with the right to have her homestead protected from
noxious fumes being emitted nearby.
Although the endowment effect suggests generally that the
assignment of a legal entitlement may affect the outcome of
bargaining, such an effect is especially likely when the entitlement is
in the form of a court order obtained after legal proceedings between
opposing parties (our focus here). This is so for several reasons.
First, the process of going through litigation may strengthen the
endowment effect. Experimental evidence suggests that there is an
61

See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability
Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 733-34 (1996).
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See, e.g., Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Willingness to Pay
vs. Willingness to Accept: Legal and Economic Implications, 71 Wash. U .
L. Q. 59, 99 (1993); Kelman, supra note 56.
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See Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, supra note 22, at 1327 (listing 12 prior
studies finding evidence of the endowment effect).
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especially strong endowment effect when a party believes that he has
earned the entitlement or that he particularly deserves it.64 Of course
someone who has received a court judgment in his favor will believe
that he has earned it. Such a person may also believe strongly that
this outcome is fair, based on the self-serving bias discussed in the
following section.
Bounded self-interest, and specifically the acrimony notions
developed above, provide an additional reason we might expect less
bargaining in real world settings than in law and economics texts.
Even if there are financial gains from making a deal, it is difficult to
bargain without communication, and litigants are often not on
speaking terms by the end of a protracted trial. Even if
communication is possible, bargains are unlikely to be struck when
both sides take pleasure in making the other side worse off; in such
circumstances it can be difficult to reach even settlements that
would substantially improve the lot of both parties. For all of these
reasons, behavioral research suggests that injunctions and damage
awards may stick even with low transaction costs (as conventionally
defined).
Note that another way of phrasing this conclusion is that the
concept of transaction costs is broader than conventional analysis
assumes. The costs of a transaction include not only the
conventionally recognized ones (for example, the cost of assembling
all of the relevant parties), but also costs such as the discomfort or
displeasure of dealing with an adversary. If “transaction costs” are
defined in this broader way, then, for the reasons given above, they
will very often be substantial in the case of bargaining around court
orders; hence, deals are unlikely to occur. This observation illustrates
an important general point. Once the behavioral analysis is
understood, it can often be incorporated into economic analyses
using standard concepts such as transactions costs. This should not
be taken to imply, however, that the behavioral analysis is
superfluous. Under the usual account, transactions costs would have
been assumed to be zero as long as the two sides could easily
negotiate.
64

George Loewenstein & Sam Issacharoff, Source-Dependence in the
Valuation of Objects, 7 J. Behav. Decision Making 157 (1994).
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It is of course true that most cases settle, so that those which do
not, and which thus produce court orders, may be atypical in some
respects. But that does not mean they are unimportant objects of
study for purposes of positive analysis. With conventional law and
economics, behavioral analysis is concerned with the fact (and the
consequences of the fact) that some cases proceed to trial.65
Although our focus in this section is on positive analysis, there is
also a tricky underlying normative issue: When people fail to reach
bargains that would be reached in the absence of endowment effects
and spiteful behavior in conditions of acrimony, is there any problem
from the standpoint of efficiency? On one view, the answer is no; if
the parties do not contract around a court-ordered outcome for these
reasons, then the outcome must be efficient (even if another,
different outcome—favoring the other side—would also have been
efficient). An underlying question, however, is whether spite ought
to count in the efficiency calculus. Some (although certainly not all)
of the most prominent utilitarian philosophers believe that it should
not.66
3. Evidence
Conventional economic theory and behavioral analysis thus
generate distinct predictions about what happens after trials. These
theories can therefore be tested with empirical evidence. What
happens once a court judgment has been entered? How often do
the parties bargain to a different outcome? Consider the set of cases
where the court has assigned an entitlement to the party who values
it less. In these circumstances, the standard theory would predict
contracting around the court order whenever transactions costs (as
conventionally defined) and wealth effects are small. (The possibility
65

Conventional law and economics attributes failures to settle primarily to
informational differences among parties. There is a large literature on this
topic, which is well summarized in Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier,
Litigation and Settlement, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the
Law (forthcoming).
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See John C. Harsany, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior, i n
Utilitarianism: For and Against 39, 55-56 (A. Sen & B. Williams eds. 1982).
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell have acknowledged this view in their
analysis of punitive damages as a response to the socially illicit gains obtained
by certain defendants. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive
Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 869, 908-10 (1998).
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of asymmetric information is discussed below in connection with
the existing empirical findings.) The behavioral theory predicts that
even in such cases, there will often be no recontracting. Since it is
unlikely that court orders are, across the board, uniquely efficient, it
should be possible to test these differing predictions.
Even without this detailed type of information, data gathered by
Ward Farnsworth suggest that there is much less post-trial
bargaining than the economic model would predict.67 Farnsworth
interviewed attorneys from approximately twenty nuisance cases in
which injunctive relief was sought and either granted or denied after
full litigation before a judge. In not a single case of those
Farnsworth studied did parties even attempt to contract around the
court order, even when transactions costs were low, and even when
an objective third party might think that there was considerable
room for mutually advantageous deals. Conventional analysis might
attribute failures to reach an ultimate agreement to asymmetric
information;68 but under such analysis it is difficult to explain the
complete failure even to negotiate. It is also interesting to note that
the lawyers interviewed said that the parties would not have reached
a contractual solution if the opposite result had been reached. (This
last point also means that the no-bargaining result cannot be
explained by supposing that the court orders entered were uniquely
efficient.)
The lawyers’ explanations for these results are behavioral in
character. Once people have received a court judgment, they are
unwilling to negotiate with the opposing party, partly because of an
unwillingness by victorious plaintiffs to confer advantages upon their
opponents. Having invested a great deal of resources in pursuing the
case all the way to court and through a trial, victors perceive
themselves as having a special right to the legally endorsed status
quo, and they are unlikely to give that right up, especially to their
opponent, for all, or most, of the tea in China. Their investment in
the entitlement gives it a distinctive character. Bargains are unlikely
in the extreme; they tend not even to occur to the plaintiff or the
defendant.
67

Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Lawsuits Bargain After
Judgment? A Glimpse Inside the Cathedral (working paper 1998).
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See e.g., Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 66, at 734-37.

35

Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics

Here, as elsewhere in this Article, our emphasis is on whether
empirical evidence exists to test the predictions of the conventional
and behavioral economic accounts, and, if more evidence would be
helpful, what sort of study might be most useful. It is frequently
remarked that law and economics is primarily theoretical or analytic,
and rarely empirical. Victory is often declared based on a dataless
model. We think that before victory can be declared for either
conventional or behavioral law and economics, the fit of the theory
with the available evidence must be assessed. For behavioral analysis,
it is not enough to build a model consistent with behavior observed
in an experimental setting (such as behavior in the ultimatum game
or the mugs experiments); the model must be compared and tested
against what we observe in the world. A good aspiration for both
conventional and behavioral approaches is careful empirical work
that provides reasonably definitive conclusions about predictive
failures and successes.
The empirical data and future empirical research discussed in this
section concern behavior after a court has entered a judgment. Of
course, most cases settle before trial, and so it is also important to ask
to what degree bargaining is likely to be successful prior to this
point. This is a separate question; bargaining may be more likely in
that setting because neither side has yet been endowed through a
court judgment with a clear entitlement. On the other hand, selfserving bias and conditions of acrimony (as well as the background
force of the “ordinary” endowment effect) may still preclude
successful bargaining. The next section examines the effect of selfserving bias on successful pretrial bargaining (as well as other forms
of bargaining) in more detail.
C. Failed Negotiations
1. Self-Serving Conceptions of Fairness
Even among the well-mannered, fair-minded agents that
populate behavioral economics, self-interest is very much alive and
well. For often there will be room for disagreement about what is
fair (or, equivalently, what is the appropriate reference
transaction)—and thus there will be the opportunity for
manipulation by self-interested parties. These parties may tend to see
things in the light most favorable to them—as, for example, when
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members of a couple asked to estimate their contribution to
household tasks give sums that significantly exceed 100%.69 While
people care about fairness, their assessments of fairness are distorted
by their own self-interest. This is a form of bounded
rationality—specifically, a judgment error; people’s perceptions are
distorted by self-serving bias.
This form of bias can help to explain the frequency of failed
negotiations. It is quite common, in cases involving divorce, child
custody, and even commercial disputes, to see protracted litigation in
circumstances in which it might be expected that the parties would
be able to reach negotiated solutions (although it of course remains
the case that most cases settle). On the standard account, the
existence of such protracted litigation is a significant puzzle. With a
good sense of the expected value of suit, parties should settle more
than they do. It may be possible to explain some of the observed
behavior in terms of asymmetric information and signaling, which
may interfere with settlement prospects.70 However, this account is
difficult to test. By contrast, the effects of self-serving bias in
negotiations have been tested empirically, as described below.
2. Evidence
The leading study in this area is one by Linda Babcock,
Xianghong Wang, and George Loewenstein on the consequences
of self-serving bias for negotiation impasse in public school teacher
contract negotiations in Pennsylvania.71 A common element of
public sector labor negotiations is for both sides to invoke
agreements in “comparable” communities, either as a measure of
market conditions or as a characterization of what is fair. Do
participants in a negotiation choose comparable communities in a
rational manner? Babcock, Wang, and Loewenstein hypothesized
that they may not; instead, both sides may adopt self-serving
judgments about which communities are “comparable,” and impasses
may result from such judgments. They designed a survey of union
and school board presidents in all school districts in Pennsylvania, in
69

Ross & Sicoly, Egocentric Biases in Availability and Attribution, 37 J.
Personality & Social Psychol. 322 (1979).
70
See, e.g., Polinsky, supra note 5, at 109-111.
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Linda Babcock, Xianghong Wang, & George Loewenstein, Choosing the
Wrong Pond, 111 Q. J. Econ. 1 (1996).
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order to elicit judgments about comparable districts for purposes of
salary negotiations. Respondents were asked to “list the districts they
felt were comparable to their own.” Note that there is no strategic
incentive here to misrepresent one’s view of which districts are
comparable, either to gain an advantage in negotiations or to curry
public favor for one’s negotiating position; the only audience for the
responses in the study was the study’s authors. Nonetheless,
substantial differences between the two sides emerged. The average
salary listed by union presidents for comparable districts was $27,633,
compared to an average of $26,922 for school board presidents. This
difference was about 2.4% of average teacher salary during a time
when salary increases averaged below 5% per year.
By itself this difference is highly suggestive; if the two sides have
different views about comparable districts, bargaining impasses may
well occur. But do these self-serving views (reported to the authors
of the study in response to a survey question) correlate with actual
behavior? Yes. The authors regressed the percentage of previous
negotiations that ended in a strike against the difference between
the two sides’ lists of comparable districts. The regression showed
that this difference had substantial explanatory power. In those
school districts where the average salary of the union’s list is $1000
greater than the board’s list, a strike is 49% more likely than where
the average salaries of the two lists are the same. Thus self-serving
biases can explain real-world bargaining impasses.
As already noted, strategic behavior does not seem to provide a
strong explanation for the empirical evidence on school-district
negotiations. There was no incentive in the study (as there would
often be in negotiations with the opposing party [deletion of
asymmetric information reference]) for parties to choose comparable
districts in a strategic manner.72 The behavioral account seems to
exhibit a higher “R2”—a better ability to predict the observed
data—than the standard account.
A fertile ground for future study of self-serving bias and its
relationship to bargaining impasse may be negotiations between
baseball players’ agents and team management. It is common
72
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practice in these negotiations for both sides to use the contracts of
“comparable” players as reference points, once again as a measure of
market conditions and as a characterization of what is fair.
Participants’ selection of which players are comparable may well be
colored by self-serving bias. Exploration of the impact of this
behavioral factor on the success or failure of these negotiations seems
far more promising than examining the role of informational
asymmetry in this setting. For the participants have equal access to
the information that defines what is a comparable player. Thus
behavioral economics appears far more likely than the conventional
model to predict and account for those negotiations that fail and
end up in the hands of an arbitrator.
In addition to the existing data on school district strikes,
researchers have conducted experimental studies on the role of selfserving bias in preventing negotiated agreements.73 The studies
involved a tort case based on real litigation in Texas.
Subjects—college and law students—were randomly assigned to the
role of plaintiff or defendant; in this role they were asked to
negotiate a settlement. They received a short summary of the case
and also twenty-seven pages of materials from the original case.
Subjects were told that the same case materials had been given to a
judge in Texas, who had reached a judgment between $0 and
$100,000. Before beginning to negotiate, subjects were asked to
write down their guesses about what the judge awarded. They were
also asked to say what they considered a fair amount for the plaintiff
to receive in a settlement. The authors found quite substantial selfserving biases in subjects’ assessments of the judge’s award. The
subjects acting as the plaintiffs guessed an average $14,527 higher
than the defendants’, and the plaintiffs’ fair settlement values
averaged $17,709 higher than those of the defendants.
Nonsettlement was strongly connected to the discrepancy in
predictions about the judge’s likely award. Note that the
hypothetical, role-playing nature of this study in some ways
strengthens the interpretation of the result. In the short time that it
73

Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff, & Colin
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took to read all the materials, subjects adopted the point of view of
roles and the bias that comes with it. Of course, the fact that roles
were only hypothetical, and the financial stakes small, means that
we cannot be sure from these studies alone that parties would display
self-serving bias in real-world settings; but the school-district study
shows the importance of the bias in such settings.
3. The Role of Lawyers
Are real lawyers immune from self-serving biases? It is possible
to overcome a bias if there are numerous opportunities for learning.
Indeed, there is some evidence that lawyers, as intermediators, are
relatively less subject to self-serving bias, in a way that can help
promote settlement.74 However, there is suggestive evidence that
self-serving bias can affect lawyers and judges as well. A study of 205
experienced bankruptcy lawyers and 150 bankruptcy judges found
self-serving biases in responses to a wide range of questions involving
how long it takes judges to rule on fee applications, the fairness of
fees, and lawyers’ fee awards in general.75 Thus, for example, thirtytwo percent of lawyers report that they never request court-ordered
compensation in excess of normal hourly rates, but judges report that
only eleven percent of lawyers never make such requests.76 This
evidence does not show that lawyers do not reduce self-serving bias
in actual litigation, but it casts doubt on the proposition that this
bias is eliminated by the involvement of professionals. To the extent
that the bias is reduced through lawyers’ involvement, it suggests
that part of the appropriate role of lawyers may be to counter their
clients’ predictable inclination to overstate the fairness of their own
cause. This may be difficult since clients are the ultimate decision
makers and lawyers may have an economic interest in not settling.
Thus serious ethical issues may arise about the lawyer’s obligations.
To the extent that debiasing by lawyers is a possibility, behavioral
research provides considerable guidance on which debiasing
74
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techniques are least likely to be successful, and which might actually
work.77
D. Mandatory Contract Terms
1. Wage and Price Effects.
One of the most frequent claims in the economic analysis of law
is that the imposition of mandatory terms on parties to a contract
will make both parties to the contract worse off; it will operate as an
effective tax on their transaction. Thus, for example, rules granting
employees a particular level of workplace safety, or tenants the right
to a habitable apartment, will make employers and employees, or
landlords and tenants, worse off.78 In this section, we suggest that
bounded rationality, in particular the endowment effect, casts doubt
on the conventional law and economics claim.
The conventional argument against mandatory contract terms
such as those just mentioned has two steps. First, since the parties
did not bargain for the term in question when left to their own
devices, the cost of the term must exceed its benefit (otherwise they
would have agreed to it on their own). Thus, for example, if a
particular employment benefit is worth $100 per year to employees
and costs the employer only $90 to provide, a mandate should not be
necessary; but if we do not observe the parties agreeing to the benefit
on their own, then the cost must exceed $100. The second step in
the conventional argument is that imposing a mandatory term in
these circumstances will operate as a tax on the parties, causing the
wage to fall (or, in the case of a habitable apartment, the price to
rise) by somewhere between the benefit and the cost of the term,
and causing the number of profitable trades to fall.79 Thus, in the
example just given, if the cost of the benefit valued at $100 is $110,
77
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then the employer will reduce the wage rate by somewhere between
$100 (the value of the benefit to employees) and $110 (the cost of
the benefit); and the level of employment will fall. This analysis
assumes an upward-sloping (not vertical) labor supply curve, but, at
least for the worker group discussed below in connection with the
existing empirical evidence (female employees), this assumption is
clearly reasonable.80
The conventional account thus offers sharp predictions about
the effects of imposing mandatory contract terms. Do the data bear
out these predictions? The leading study in this area is a study of the
effects of imposing mandatory coverage of childbirth expenses in
employer-provided insurance policies.81 Imposition of the mandatory
health-insurance term—which represented a substantial departure
from the usual contractual arrangements prior to the
mandate—caused the wages of affected workers (most prominently,
married women of childbearing age) to fall by at least the cost of the
mandated coverage according to most of the author’s estimates.82
The study also found that the hours of employment of these
workers were either unchanged or slightly higher with the mandate
and that their probability of being employed was either unchanged
or slightly lower.83 In sum, “[t]he findings consistently suggest
shifting of the costs of the mandates on the order of 100 percent,
with little effect on net labor input.”84 These findings are not easy to
reconcile with the conventional account, which predicts a fall in
wages less than the cost of the benefit. (If the wage were going to
adjust by the full cost of the benefit, then some substantial fraction
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of employers should have offered the benefit even prior to the
mandate.)
2. Behavioral Analysis
Departures from the assumptions of expected utility
maximization by unboundedly rational agents suggest a different
account of the effects of imposing mandatory contract terms, one
that is consistent with the empirical findings just described. As
noted above, the endowment effect implies that people are often less
willing to sell entitlements that are given to them than to buy
entitlements that they do not already possess; if given a mug, they
will not sell it for $3, but if not given a mug, they will not buy one
for that price. Thus, the fact that an employee (say) chooses not to
purchase a particular workplace benefit if he is not granted an
entitlement to it does not imply that he would want to sell the
entitlement (if he could) once it has been granted. The corollary of
this observation is that imposing a mandatory term may have
different effects than the standard analysis predicts. In supply-anddemand terms, imagine a labor supply curve prior to the imposition
of the mandate, reflecting willingness to work at different wage
levels given provision of the benefit; the consequence of the
endowment effect may be that this curve is shifted to the right once
the mandate is imposed, and this move may more than compensate
for the backward shift in the employer’s labor demand curve as a
result of the mandate. If this occurs, then the wages of the affected
worker will fall by as much or more than the cost of the benefit.
This is precisely what the study of mandated childbirth coverage
finds.85
85
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Three caveats are important here. First, we do not say that the
endowment effect is only consistent with complete or more than
complete adjustment of the wage or price. Perhaps workers are not
any more willing to supply labor in exchange for a given wage plus
the benefit in question once they have an entitlement to the benefit;
it may be just that they would be even less willing to supply labor in
the absence of the benefit. It is also possible that conventional
economic analysis, by incorporating a market failure such as adverse
selection (a possibility not discussed by the above-mentioned critics
of mandatory contract terms), can explain the empirical findings
discussed above.86 Our point is just the modest one that the
behavioral account can predict an instance of observed behavior that
is inconsistent with the standard law and economics account of
mandatory terms. Future empirical work could attempt to address
the adverse selection possibility by examining the effects of
mandatory contract terms in a setting in which (in contrast to the
insurance context) adverse selection is unlikely to be a significant
force.
The second qualification is that the endowment effect may not
operate in contexts in which the beneficiaries of a mandatory term
must give up a preexisting level of income, since they may be highly
averse to such a loss.87 This qualification applies only to situations in
which there is a financial loss relative to some preexisting
expectation; thus it would not apply to, for example, a consumer’s
purchase of a durable good at a higher price due to the inclusion of a
warranty. The final qualification here is that our analysis in this
section is purely positive, concerned with the effects of imposing a
mandatory contract term. The endowment effect does not
necessarily imply that, from a normative perspective, mandatory
terms are desirable; they may be efficient, in the sense that they
would not be undone (if they could be) once imposed, but the
situation without such terms is also efficient, for the same reasons
given by the standard account, and there is no obvious means by
which the two situations can be compared. Unlike several of the
scenarios discussed in Part V below, in which we think there is
often a relatively strong argument for choosing one normative
86
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benchmark over another (say because people are likely to
underestimate certain objective probabilities based on some form of
judgment error), here there does not seem to be a clear basis for such
a decision.
Our emphasis, then, is the positive question of the effects of
imposing mandatory contract terms. The primary point is that there
is a substantial research agenda to test various hypotheses; what we
wish to suggest is that the conventional view cannot be accepted a
priori and that there is reason to think that behavioral law and
economics points in helpful directions.
III. The Content of Law
One of the goals of law and economics is to explain the content
of law—what the law allows and what it prohibits. The traditional
approach provides two tools for this analysis. First, laws may be
efficient solutions to the problems of organizing society. Such laws
can be thought of solutions to optimal contracting problems with all
of the affected parties at the table.88 Second, laws may come about
because of the rent-seeking activities of politically powerful actors;
many laws that benefit farmers, the elderly, labor unions, and
concentrated industries have been explained along these lines.89 The
positive theory of law reflected in the conventional account thus
predicts that the legal rules we observe will be rules that either
maximize social wealth (if they are judge-made rules) or redistribute
wealth to interest groups able to influence the legislative process.
Law and economics scholars who reject this account of the content
of law have not offered any alternative account to explain and
predict the rules we observe.
The notion that laws emerge from considerations of efficiency
and conventional rent seeking would probably strike most citizens as
odd. Instead, we suspect that most members of society—which is to
say most of the people who are entitled to elect legislators—hold the
view, undoubtedly naively, that the purpose of the law is to codify
“right” and “wrong.” Certainly many criminal statutes would be
88
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explained without reference to either of the above factors. In this
section we argue that law and economics explanations of the
content of law need to be modified by incorporating the ideas of
bounded self-interest (in the form of fairness norms) and bounded
rationality developed above. As we will try to show, many laws on
the books appear to be difficult to justify on efficiency grounds (for
example, those that prohibit mutually beneficial exchanges without
obvious externalities) and seem to benefit groups that do not have
much lobbying power (such as the poor or middle class). We argue
that the explanation for the “anomalous” laws is typically a quite
simple one: most people think the result is fair. We also suggest that
some laws we observe reflect neither efficiency nor conventional
rent seeking but, instead, aspects of bounded rationality. Our point is
not the general (and rather obvious) one that fairness concerns and
bounded rationality may shape the content of law; we seek to show
specifically how behavioral analysis can provide real predictive and
explanatory power for particular laws we observe. We also do not
claim that fairness concerns and bounded rationality explain every
aspect of the content of law—just that they provide a useful
supplement to existing explanations.90
The mechanisms underlying our behavioral economic account of
the content of law are simple and conventional. With the existing
analysis, we assume (for present purposes, and insofar as statutory
rather than judge-made law is concerned) that legislators are
maximizers interested in their own reelection. Legislators interested
in their own reelection will be responsive to the preferences and
judgments of their constituents and those of powerful interest
groups. If constituents believe that a certain practice is unfair or
dangerous, and should be banned or regulated, self-interested
legislators will respond, even if they do not share these views.
Likewise, if a mobilized group holds such views, legislators’ response
will be affected, in much the same way as if the group sought
90
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legislation to serve a narrowly defined financial self-interest, as
posited by the standard account.
Mobilized groups may also attempt to manage and exploit the
public’s views, including views influenced by bounded self-interest
and bounded rationality, to bolster their own efforts; a prime
example discussed below is the “availability entrepreneur,” who seeks
to publicize an event in order to make it more “available” to the
general public, and thus to increase the public’s demand for
regulation. We suspect that a full account of the content of law
would have to incorporate legislators’ independent judgments about
fairness or risk, which play an occasional role; but we do not discuss
that point here because for the examples we consider, public and
interest-group perceptions seem to provide a good (and the most
parsimonious) account of the laws we observe.
A. Bans on Market Transactions
This section discusses the demand for the law insofar as that
demand is affected by people’s bounded self-interest and in particular
by their taste for fairness as they understand it. We do not mean to
defend the laws that we describe; we suggest more modestly that
people’s commitment to fairness is part of the causal mechanism
that establishes those laws. Fairness norms interact with other forces
to produce some of the seemingly anomalous laws we observe.
“Fairness entrepreneurs” may play a role, mobilizing public
judgments to serve their (selfish or non-selfish) interests.
1. Bans on Economic Transactions
(a) A puzzle
A pervasive feature of law is that mutually desired trades are
blocked. Perhaps most puzzling amidst this landscape—which
includes bans on baby-selling and vote-trading, discussed below—are
bans on conventional “economic” transactions, such as usurious
lending, price gouging, and ticket scalping. Usury, or charging an
interest rate above a certain level, is prohibited by most states in
consumer lending transactions; price gouging, or the charging of
“grossly excessive” or “unconscionable” prices, is prohibited during
“states of emergency” (as after a flood or other natural disaster) in
many states that have recent experience with such events; and ticket
scalping, or the resale of tickets at prices well above face prices (in
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excess of a modest margin to cover ticket brokers’ costs), is prohibited
by roughly half of all states, including New York (with its heavy
theater population) and its neighboring states.91 What accounts for
these laws, which impose constraints on gain-producing
transactions for ordinary commodities such as television sets and
theater tickets?
Not surprisingly, economists and economically oriented lawyers
often view these laws as inefficient and anomalous.92 The laws also
do not generally seem well explained in terms of conventional rentseeking by a politically powerful faction. One might argue that
ticket-scalping laws are an exception to this last point, on the
ground that ticket sellers (who may be politically powerful) might
91

On usury, see, for example, Uniform Consumer Credit Code §2.201. O n
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56:8-37; N. J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-38; N. M. Stat. Ann. § 30-46-1; N. Y. [Arts
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lobby in favor of the laws because moderate prices are necessary to
create demand, which in turn certifies quality.93 (Thus, for example,
the argument would be that restaurant owners do not raise prices
when waits develop for tables, and if a secondary market in
restaurant reservations were to develop with very high prices for
tables, restaurateurs might wish to outlaw it.) The difficulty with
this form of argument as applied here is that it cannot explain the
application of ticket-scalping laws to perennially popular events
whose quality is known from TV—a category that includes most
professional sporting events. Our point here is actually a more
general one: although it may be possible to offer efficiency or
conventional rent-seeking explanations for certain sorts of laws
banning economic transactions, there does not seem to be a general
theory or set of theories that can explain all or even most of these
laws on traditional grounds.94
(b) A behavioral account
By contrast, laws banning usurious lending, price gouging, and
ticket scalping when such activities are prevalent are a
straightforward prediction of the theory of perceived fairness
developed in Part II above. (We assume here that self-interested
legislators are responsive to citizens’ or other actors’ demand for the
content of law.) In the case of each of these bans, the transaction in
question is a significant departure from the usual terms of trade in
the market for the good in question—that is, a significant departure
from the “reference transaction.” Behavioral analysis predicts that if
trades are occurring frequently in a given jurisdiction at terms far
from those of the reference transaction, there will be strong pressure
for a law banning such trades. Note that the prediction is not that all
high prices (ones that make it difficult or impossible for some people
to afford things they might want) will be banned; what we predict
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See Gary S. Becker, A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples of
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economic grounds, see Eric Posner, Contract Law in the Welfare State, 24 J.
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will be banned are transactions at terms far from the terms on
which those transactions generally occur in the marketplace.
Consider this example:
A store has been sold out of the popular Cabbage Patch dolls for
a month. A week before Christmas a single doll is discovered in a
store room. The managers know that many customers would
like to buy the doll. They announce over the store’s public
address system that the doll will be sold by auction to the
customer who offers to pay the most.95
Nearly three-quarters of the respondents judged this action to be
either somewhat unfair or very unfair, though, of course, an
economic analysis would judge the auction the most efficient
method of assuring that the doll goes to the person who values it
most.96 Although the auction is efficient, it represents a departure
from the “reference transaction,” under which the doll is sold at its
usual price. (Of course, there would be no need for a law banning
such behavior, since it does not appear to be prevalent.) As in the
doll example, if money is loaned to individuals at a rate of interest
significantly greater than the rate at which similarly-sized loans are
made to other customers, then the lender’s behavior may be viewed
as unfair. Since lumber generally tends to sell for a particular price,
sales at far higher prices in the wake of (say) a hurricane, which
drives demand sky high, are thought unfair. Tickets to sporting
events or the theater often sell for around the face price of the ticket,
so large mark-ups over that amount are judged unfair. Consistent
with this last suggestion, subjects asked whether a team should
allocate its few remaining tickets to a key football game through an
auction thought that this approach would be unfair; allocation based
on who waited in line longest was the preferred solution.97 Of
course, waiting in line for tickets is precisely what happens with laws
against ticket scalping. Thus, pervasive fairness norms appear to
shape attitudes (and hence possibly law) on usury, price gouging, and
ticket scalping.
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“Conventional economic analyses assume as a matter of course
that excess demand for a good creates an opportunity for suppliers to
raise prices” and that “[t]he profit-seeking adjustments that clear the
market are . . . as natural as water finding its level—and as ethically
neutral,” but “the lay public does not share this indifference.”98 A
system in which, for example, only fans able to pay $3000 could
attend the Super Bowl would be a system characterized by the sort
of severe departure from the reference transaction that people view
as intolerable. As a letter-writer to the New York Times colorfully put
it in responding to coverage of ticket-scalping laws: “With legalized
scalping, lower- and middle-income consumers would be relegated
to watching events at home or buying overpriced seats in the
nosebleed section”; such a system of “entertainment Darwinism”
would be a “raw deal” for the average consumer.99
We emphasize that we need not (and do not) find these views of
fairness necessarily rational or compelling. Many of those who think
“usurious” lenders are “unfair” might not have thought through the
implications of their views (for example, that paying an outrageous
price for a loan may be better than paying an infinite price, or that a
loan to a riskier borrower is a product different in kind from a loan
to a safer borrower). Still, if such views are widespread, they may
underlie certain patterns in the content of law, such as the legal
restrictions on usury, price gouging and ticket scalping. Our claim
here is a positive one about the content of the law we observe, not a
prescriptive or normative one about the shape practices or rules
should take. As a positive matter, behavioral analysis predicts that if
trades are commonly occurring with terms far from those of the
reference transaction, then legal rules will often ban trades on such
terms.
We do not claim to have offered a definitive explanation for the
pattern of usury, price gouging, and ticket scalping laws we observe.
Usury seems to be generally prohibited across states, so one is not
faced with the question of why we observe bans in some states but
not others. The same cannot be said of price gouging and ticket
scalping; each is prohibited only in certain states. Price gouging
appears to be prohibited primarily by states who have recently
98
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experienced (or whose neighbors have recently experienced) natural
disasters; and ticket scalping laws may be concentrated in states with
very popular theater or sporting events. More in-depth empirical
research would be required to determine if these patterns bear out,
and whether conventional interest-group theories provide an
alternative account. Our goal here is simply to suggest the likelihood,
from the perspective of behavioral law and economics, that observed
laws reflect, in systematic and predictable ways, fairness
considerations as well as efficiency and conventional forms of rent
seeking.
(c) Private behavior
It is interesting to note that these transaction-banning laws
often mimic, rather than constrain, the behavior of the firms they
regulate. Consider first usury: It is a well-known puzzle of lending
markets that lenders often refuse to loan money to risky borrowers at
above-market interest rates; rather, someone either qualifies for a
loan at the offered rate or does not qualify for a loan at all.100 This is
true even when a modest increase in the interest rate would not
violate usury laws.101 (Adverse selection considerations may also
explain this behavior,102 but they cannot easily explain the existence
of laws against such behavior.) Price gouging and ticket scalping are
similar in terms of private actors’ behavior. Thus, when Hurricane
Andrew hit Florida and the demand for lumber and other building
supplies skyrocketed, Home Depot, a major national chain,
continued to sell these goods at its usual prices, despite the fact that
the stock could have been sold at an enormous (short-term) profit,
and despite the fact that no then-existing law banned price
100
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increases.103 More generally, economists have often remarked on the
failure of firms to increase prices in response to temporary increases
in demand.104 Likewise, an interesting feature of ticket-scalping
laws is that they will keep prices down only to the extent that firms
choose to sell tickets at reasonable prices in the first place; but in fact
firms routinely do this. For example, during the 1997 NBA playoffs,
the Chicago Bulls sold some tickets to the general public at prices
that were somewhat higher than regular season games but a fraction
of the price the tickets commanded on the (legal in Illinois) ticket
broker open market. As the head of a major theater company
explained, “there’s a strong public relations argument” against raising
prices for tickets for very popular shows [and presumably sporting
events as well]—despite excess demand for seats at the going
prices—because the public already believes “that Broadway ticket
prices are too high.”105 “Even though we could sell tickets at $100,”
another theater owner said, “we’d be cutting our own throats
because it would be a P.R. disaster for Broadway.”106 Why would it
be a “P.R. disaster” if the market would allow them to sell their
tickets at $100? We think this would be so because a $100 ticket
price for a very popular show would have been viewed as unfair by
many members of the public given that the usual price for a ticket
was below this.
Consistent with the foregoing analysis, recent evidence of price
stickiness shows that firms’ behavior is affected greatly by their
customers’ perceptions of unfair price increases.107 Note that this is
not a standard reputation story; fairness considerations are the reason
that raising prices harms the firm’s reputation. None of this is to say
that firms never raise prices in an opportunistic fashion; for instance,
103
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when sports teams sell playoff tickets to season ticket holders at
below-market prices, it may be that the ticket holders paid a
premium for the playoff tickets ex ante (through the purchase of
season tickets). In each of the contexts we examine, our point is just
the modest one that fairness norms often seem to constrain firms’
behavior in much the same way that they shape laws against
behavior violating those norms.
Why then are the laws necessary? Some of the relevant actors
will not be constrained by fairness norms in the absence of a law.
Noninstitutional lenders may be willing to lend at exorbitant rates;
suppliers selling lumber out of the back of pick-up trucks will often
charge whatever the market will bear (as occurred after Hurricane
Andrew, prompting the enactment of a price-gouging law);108
ticket scalpers, who are typically anonymous actors engaged in onetime transactions, have no reason to keep prices down. It is these
actors who are regulated by the law. The more powerful mainstream
firms will tend to support, or at least not oppose, rules banning
unfair transactions. (Note, though, that their support would not be
predicted by the standard account.)
2. Other Bans
Laws banning economic transactions are just a species of a
broader form of regulation of transactions. Many deals are blocked,
across a wide range of contexts. People may not buy and sell body
parts. They cannot trade rights of free speech or sell their votes. In
some states, commercial surrogacy is prohibited, and both
prostitution and baby-selling are banned in all states. People may
not contract around bans on race and sex discrimination, as for
example through written agreements. Blocked trades can be found
in every American jurisdiction.
Bans of this variety raise serious normative questions; those
questions have been well-ventilated. Doubtless reasonable
distinctions can be drawn between bans in different areas;
sometimes externalities are readily apparent. We make a simple
positive point here. Behavioral analysis suggests that pervasive
judgments about fairness may account for many such bans on
voluntary deals. Whether or not those judgments make sense, they
108
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seem to be widespread, and they help to explain the persistence of
legislation that is often difficult to explain by reference to an
efficiency or rent-seeking account. In banning certain deals,
legislators may be responding to community sentiments about what
kinds of things are properly subject to market arrangements. The
reference transaction in these areas is generally “no transaction”; just
as the norm or benchmark is the usual or face price of the ticket, or
an equal division of the amount to be divided in the ultimatum
game, the norm or benchmark here is “no market exchange.”
Departures from that norm are viewed as unfair and are prohibited.
How could this behavioral theory of law be tested? One idea is
to determine, based on historical evidence, what sorts of transactions
were generally not engaged in (despite their being technologically
feasible—for example, baby selling) regardless of the existence of a
law banning them. These transactions could be said to have a notransaction benchmark. (The importance of looking to a pre-law
benchmark is that the existence of a legal ban could itself produce a
no-market-exchange reference point, in which case the reference
point obviously could not account for the existence of the ban.)
Behavioral analysis predicts that such transactions will be legally
censured. The existing law and economics analysis, by contrast,
predicts that such transactions will be banned only if a ban is either
efficient or favorable to a politically powerful interest group.
B. Prior Restraints on Speech
Another instance in which fairness-related norms, and in
addition bounded rationality, may affect law involves one of the
enduring puzzles in first amendment law: the special judicial
hostility to “prior restraints” on speech, most notably injunctions.109
A court may well refuse to issue an injunction against speech even if
it would allow subsequent punishment of that same speech. The
puzzle is that a prior restraint involves subsequent punishment too;
what an injunction means is that a violator will be subject to
(subsequent) sanctions. Why is a criminal statute any less
problematic than an injunction whose violation produces criminal
penalties?
109
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Conventional economic analysis provides no satisfying answer to
this question. True, the injunction might be thought to create the
prospect of a greater total punishment for the speech, but no one
has suggested that the First Amendment imposes limits on the
severity of punishment for speech that the government is entitled to
criminalize. In any case, many criminal statutes impose greater
punishments than many injunctions, and the latter are nonetheless
more troublesome than the former.
Can behavioral analysis explain the law’s special treatment of
prior restraints? As noted in Part I.B above, court-ordered remedies
are likely to create special forms of attachment for their beneficiaries;
individuals will typically be reluctant to forego rights granted by such
remedies, due to the perceived unfairness of that outcome and the
type of attachment created by the endowment effect. This is apt to
be as true for prosecutors as for everyone else. A prosecutor who has
sought an injunction may be particularly insistent on ensuring that
punishment occurs. A criminal statute, standing by itself and
unaccompanied by an injunction, is likely to produce a different
response on the part of the prosecutor. Reasonable defendants know
the difference. Hence it is especially important for a court to ensure
that any injunction imposed on speech is not issued in advance of an
accurate judgment that the speech involved is unprotected by the first
amendment.
As it happens, this account matches the most sophisticated
defenses of the special barrier to prior restraints.110 Those defenses
urge that the real purpose of the prior restraint doctrine is to ensure
that no regulation is imposed without a reliable judgment that the
first amendment does not protect the speech at risk. The doctrine is
difficult to explain on conventional economic principles but is a
natural inference from behavioral ones.
C. Anecdote-Driven Environmental Legislation (With Particular
Reference to Superfund)
1. Estimating the Likelihood of Uncertain Events
Thus far the discussion has focused on the role of bounded selfinterest (specifically, fairness-related norms) and the endowment
110
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effect in predicting and explaining the content of law. But
judgment errors by boundedly rational individuals also play a
significant role here. In particular, people seek law in areas such as
environmental legislation on the basis of their judgments about the
probabilities associated with certain harmful activities. Their
judgments about probabilities will often be affected by how
“available” other instances of the harm in question are, that is, on
how easily such instances come to mind. In this section we offer an
account of the Superfund statute, perhaps the most well-known and
popular environmental statute, on this ground.
Here is a familiar example of availability: individuals asked how
many seven-letter words in a 2,000-word section of a novel end in
“ing” give much larger estimates than individuals asked how many
words in such a section have “n” as the second-to-last letter, despite
the fact that objectively there are more words which satisfy the latter
criterion than the former.111 Reliance on how “available” instances
of the event in question are is a form of judgment error, but the
error is fully rational—in the sense of reflecting optimizing
behavior—for people with limited information. Still, it can lead to
systematic errors in probability assessment. In the context of
environmental legislation, it encourages the well-known “pollutant
of the month” syndrome, where regulation is driven by recent and
memorable instances of harm. When beliefs and preferences are
produced by a set of probability judgments, made inaccurate by the
availability heuristic, legislation will predictably become anecdotedriven. Many illustrations come to mind: the elimination of the
pesticide Alar from the market after a public outcry generated by the
television show “60 Minutes”; the outcry over Agent Orange and
Times Beach; the banning of both saccharin and asbestos in schools
after a large amount of media attention. The same phenomenon
may occur in other areas of regulatory law; an example here is the
move toward heavy regulation of school bus safety in the wake of
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media coverage of school bus accidents in which children were
killed.112
What determines how available a particular environmental
hazard is? Two factors are particularly important: the observed
frequency of the hazard and its salience. Thus, if a particular hazard
has materialized recently, people are likely to attach a higher
probability to its occurring in the future. And this is particularly true
if the hazard has a high degree of salience—as, for instance, with
the discovery of asbestos in schools, where many children are
present. Apart from the nature of the event, salience is heavily
influenced by the way the event is packaged by the media, organized
interest groups, and politicians.
Interested actors in the private and public sectors can be expected
to exploit the availability heuristic for their own purposes. These
actors are amateur behavioralists, operating strategically to promote
their selfish or nonselfish goals. “Availability entrepreneurs” will thus
focus attention on a specific event in order to ensure that this event
will be salient and available to many members of the public.113 Wellorganized groups in the private sector very frequently use this
strategy, thus showing that they are fine behavioralists. Selfinterested politicians may use similar strategies to enhance their
reelection prospects. Although self-serving behavior by such actors is
of course an element of the conventional economic account, the role
of such factors as availability is not; this is what is added by
behavioral analysis.
The availability heuristic can lead to under- as well as overregulation. People sometimes (although not always) underestimate
the likelihood of low-probability or low salience events because these
threats simply do not make it onto people’s “radar screens”;114 many
112
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health and environmental risks (such as the health threats from poor
diet and exercise) may fit this description with some parts of the
population. But when a particular threat, even an unlikely one,
becomes available, as when, for example, asbestos is discovered in
schools, then regulation will be demanded. The behavioral account
thus predicts a patchwork of environmental laws characterized by
both over- and under-regulation, with over-regulation when a
particular risk has recently materialized, particularly if the harm in
question is highly salient.
2. Superfund
The basic point that availability may affect the demand for
environmental legislation is not new.115 We wish to add two
features to the analysis: first, an understanding of the mechanisms
through which the availability heuristic may operate to produce
environmental legislation (and here we emphasize the notion of
“availability entrepreneurs”); and second, the fact that the behavioral
account predicts the enactment of Superfund, a major piece of
environmental legislation that is not readily explained on
conventional grounds.
Conventional approaches point to the important role of interest
groups in shaping environmental law; these groups can use the law
to redistribute resources in their preferred directions. Some of these
groups are sincerely concerned with environmental protection;
others have economic interests for which environmental issues
operate as a smokescreen. Explanations of this kind have had some
success, but they fail to account for Superfund.
Of course it is possible (as it always is) to generate post hoc
accounts that show that some groups benefited from legislation, and
to suggest that such legislation was passed because some groups
benefited from it. Superfund is no exception. But an examination of
the history of the statute shows that this explanation is extremely
Decision Processes for Low Probability Events: Policy Implications, 8 J. Pol.
Anal. & Management 565, 566 (1989).
115
See Roger G. Noll & James Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive
Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. Legal Stud. 747, 762 (1990) (suggesting
that availability may affect the pattern of environmental regulation we observe);
Cass R. Sunstein, Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit
State, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 247, 265-66 (1996) (same).
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weak. Interest groups played little part in initiating its enactment.
Instead the key actor, as described more fully below, was the
Environmental Protection Agency, and the key mechanism was the
availability heuristic.
Superfund was passed with substantial legislative and public
support; in light of its crudely drafted character and uncertain
empirical support, what is remarkable is how little opposition the
statute provoked. What is even more remarkable is that for the last
seventeen years, Americans have consistently ranked “abandoned
toxic waste dumps” among the three most important environmental
problems, even though experts believe that this is one of the least
pressing environmental problems, if indeed it qualifies as a serious
problem at all. Experts contend that in terms of risks to human
health, there are at least a dozen problems that are more serious;
many of them receive less in the way of public (and legislative)
support.
Availability provides a convincing explanation of Superfund’s
existence and its endurance. Its initial development occurred when
officials within EPA, concerned about an apparent gap in federal
law and eager to consolidate their authority over issues of public
health, began to draft new legislation in order to respond to the
existence of abandoned hazardous waste sites. But it is doubtful that
EPA could have succeeded if not for the fact that in August of
1978, national news began to focus on what was soon seen as a
“ticking time bomb” at Love Canal, New York, consisting of
apparent leaks from the disposal of 21,000 tons of chemical waste
into the Canal between 1943 and 1952. In the middle and late
1970s, studies of groundwater and cancer incidence appeared to
show that the leaks had created serious health risks, to the point
where the New York Health Commissioner declared a public
emergency on August 2, 1978. Within two weeks, President Carter
declared an emergency in the area. A kind of cascade effect occurred,
and hence in the period between August and October, 1978, the
national news was saturated with stories of the risks to citizens near
Love Canal.
The publicity continued in 1979 and 1980, the crucial years for
Superfund’s enactment. There can be no doubt that the Love Canal
publicity was pivotal to the law’s passage in 1980. In that year, Time
magazine made the topic a cover story, and network documentaries
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followed suit. Polls showed that eighty percent of Americans
favored prompt federal action to identify and clean up potentially
hazardous abandoned waste sites. Congress responded quickly with
the new statute. And to this date, American presidents and serious
presidential candidates of both major parties invoke abandoned
hazardous waste dumps as a leading environmental problem. By the
way, it remains unproven that Love Canal created significant health
risks at any stage.
The behavioral account of Superfund is that the availability of
“Love Canal” as a symbol for the problem of abandoned hazardous
waste dumps greatly intensified public concern, to the point where a
legislative response became nearly inevitable, no matter what the
actual facts might be.116 And there can be no doubt that proponents
of Superfund self-consciously exploited the Love Canal incident.
During crucial periods in the legislative debate, the prime proponent
of the new legislation—the EPA—warned, very publicly, that
hundreds of “Love Canals” could be found throughout the country.
The EPA thus became an “availability entrepreneur,” focusing
attention on a specific event in order to ensure that this event would
be highly available to many members of the public.
We do not say that conventional interest-group considerations
played no role in the specific shape the Superfund statute took. The
ultimate design of the statute surely owed a great deal to what
relevant interest groups were willing to tolerate; though powerful
private groups did not seek the legislation, they did influence its
content and structure. But the enactment and continued popularity
of Superfund is not predicted by the conventional account alone.
The behavioral account, in contrast, suggests that the occurrence of
an event such as Love Canal, particularly when played up and
dramatized by the media and other actors, will produce a legislative
response. Superfund is one example; regulatory responses to Alar,
Agent Orange, saccharin, and asbestos are others. Available
instances of risk or threat seem to shape the content of law.

116
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IV. Prescriptions
In this Part we shift our focus from the positive to the
prescriptive. Instead of seeking to explain what the effects of law
will be and why we have the laws we do, we now explore how the
law can best be structured to achieve specified ends—deterring
socially undesirable behavior through the tort system, encouraging
measures that enhance human health, and so on. Our claim in each
context we examine is that attention to behavioral insights can
improve the law’s ability to move society toward desired outcomes.
Our primary emphasis is on problems in processing information,
problems that create difficulties both for juries during trials and for
those responding to information required by government or coming
from government itself. Thus bounded rationality, in the form of
both judgment errors and behavior in accordance with prospect
theory rather than expected utility theory, are the central emphases
in this Part. Section A deals with juries, while section B deals with
government information campaigns and mandatory disclosure.
Section C emphasizes our second bound on human behavior,
bounded willpower, and discusses its relevance to prescriptions
directed toward deterring crime.
This Part discusses only a handful of the many areas in which
sound prescriptive analysis may require us to consider possible bounds
on jurors’ or other actors’ decision making. Other authors have
applied these insights to other topics in the economic analysis of
law. Thus, for example, Daniel Kahneman and David Schkade,
along with one of the present authors (Sunstein), have challenged
the economic prescription for punitive damage awards recently
offered by A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell: that juries
should be instructed to focus on the probability of nondetection of
the tortfeasor’s activities in order to achieve optimal deterrence
through punitive awards.117 From the behavioral point of view, this
prescription fails to appreciate the cognitive and motivational
limitations on jury decision making. Because of the hindsight bias
and overoptimism problems described below, juries will have
difficulty making probability estimates, and in addition they appear
to come to the task of awarding punitive damages with strong
117

Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 66, at 887-91.

Chicago Working Paper in Law and Economics

62

retributive instincts.118 Thus the goal of optimal deterrence may well
be best achieved through administrative agencies rather than
juries.119
Another example of the application of behavioral economics to
prescriptive analysis is Thomas Jackson’s discussion of discharge
policy in bankruptcy law. Although standard economic ideas of risk
allocation would often support nondischargeability of debts, Jackson
draws on aspects of what we have termed bounded rationality and
bounded willpower to support the “fresh start” policy of discharge
and to sketch the specific contours it should take.120 Our goal in this
Part is to point to some additional topics in the economic analysis of
law in which a more accurate understanding of decision making can
improve upon conventional law and economics prescriptions.
A. Negligence Determinations and Other Determinations of Fact
1. Background
Frequently juries are called upon to determine the probability of
an event that ended up occurring; a prominent example is the
negligence standard, which in its usual formulation requires jurors to
assess the costs and benefits of the defendant’s course of action from
an ex ante perspective, and thus to determine the probability that
harm would end up coming of that action. These determinations
are made with the “benefit” of hindsight; jurors know at the time
they make their decision that the event in question did in fact occur.
Jurors’ determinations are thus likely to be afflicted by “hindsight
bias”—the pronounced tendency of decision makers to attach an
excessively high probability to an event simply because it ended up
occurring.121 Hindsight bias has been observed in a large number of
studies, including studies of “expert” actors such as physicians, who,
when asked to assess the probabilities of alternative diagnoses, given
118
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a set of symptoms, give significantly different estimates depending
on what they are told the actual diagnosis turned out to be.122
Hindsight bias has also been observed in at least two studies on
negligence determinations specifically.123 In the negligence studies,
jurors—armed with knowledge that harm had in fact
occurred—were found to attach significantly higher probabilities to
harm than ex ante decision makers—those not informed of the
occurrence of harm.124 This is a straightforward prediction of the
many prior studies on hindsight bias.125 Although the negligence
studies asked for individual rather than group probabilities (raising
the question whether group interaction on an actual jury could
dispel hindsight bias), other studies have found the bias in group as
well as individual settings.126
Hindsight bias will lead juries making negligence determinations
to find defendants liable more frequently than if cost-benefit
analysis were done correctly—that is, on an ex ante basis. Plaintiffs
will win cases they deserve to lose. This prediction is consistent with
the frequently expressed (though difficult to verify) view that the
tort system imposes too much liability.127
A threshold issue raised by the hindsight-bias account of
negligence determinations is whether hindsight bias is simply a
122
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countervailing weight to a tendency on the part of defendants to
underestimate the likelihood of being sanctioned. A common
feature of human behavior is overoptimism: people tend to think
that bad events are far less likely to happen to them than to others.
Thus, most people think their probability of a bad outcome is far less
than others’ probability, although of course this cannot be true for
more than half the population.128 If defendants exhibit such
overoptimism, then they will be underdeterred by a correct
application of the negligence standard; overestimation of the
probability of harm based on hindsight bias will then be a desirable
countervailing factor. We think that defendant overoptimism is
likely to be a much smaller factor for firms than for individual
defendants, since firms that make systematic errors in judgment will
be at a competitive disadvantage. And for individuals, the role of
overoptimism is likely to vary significantly with context. In a case in
which the threat of being found liable is highly salient, individuals
will be likely to overestimate the likelihood of being sanctioned.
Hindsight bias, in contrast, seems to be an across-the-board
phenomenon; it has been observed in a wide range of contexts across
many studies and is likely to be present whenever a jury makes a
negligence determination.
It is also possible that the occurrence of harm itself provides
genuine information about the probability of harm; this fact has led
some to suggest the use of an “ex post negligence” standard, under
which negligence is assessed based on the information available ex
post, rather than ex ante.129 But hindsight bias suggests that decision
makers weigh the fact of harm heavily in assessing the probability of
128
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harm even when the fact of harm does not provide any new
information about that probability.130
The findings on hindsight bias provide new empirical support
for the old idea that such bias may distort negligence
determinations. However, despite the vast law and economics
literature in the area of torts, no attention seems to have been paid
to the potentially significant implications of hindsight bias for
achieving optimal deterrence—the goal posited by that literature,
and the goal on which we focus here. (Thus, we accept this goal for
purposes of our prescriptive analysis; we do not necessarily endorse
this goal from a normative perspective.) Law and economics scholars
generally approve of the use of the negligence standard for achieving
that goal; that standard, if applied in an error-free fashion, leads to
an efficient level of precaution (although other standards will as
well).131 These scholars have also analyzed reasons that legal rules,
including the negligence standard, may be imperfectly applied, but
they do not offer any clear prescriptions for addressing this problem,
since as they see it, the problem does not have a clear direction;
either underdeterrence or overdeterrence relative to correct
application of the cost-benefit standard is possible.132 In contrast, we
can offer clear prescriptions because the hindsight bias points in a
clear direction: overdeterrence (again relative to what correct costbenefit analysis would produce).
In fact the law in areas such as patent law already takes clear
steps to address the problems caused by hindsight bias. Thus, as
Jeffrey Rachlinski has recently pointed out, patent courts are
required to guard against hindsight bias in determining whether an
invention was “nonobvious” at the time of invention—despite its
now (perhaps) seeming obvious—by looking to such “secondary
considerations” as “‘commercial success, long felt but unsolved need,
[and] failure of others.’”133 But in the area of tort law the existing
130
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responses are partial and incomplete at best.134 So deeply ingrained,
in fact, does hindsight bias seem to be in the tort system that even
when it is called to a court’s attention, it may be difficult for the
court to recognize or address it. A colorful example is provided by
litigation in which one of the present authors (Thaler) was an
expert witness. The litigation involved whether investment decisions
involving $100 million in assets had been made in a negligent
fashion. Although the court explicitly recognized that “case law . . .
ties [this determination] to the circumstances extant at the time in
question, rather than as they may appear in hindsight,” the court
characterized as “very imaginative” defendant’s offer of testimony
that “a decision based on information known at the time the
decision was made can be evaluated as good or bad without regard to
the outcome. In that way the evaluation is not biased by
hindsight.”135 Although the judge was very active throughout the
trial, he never suggested that the expert testimony offered by the
plaintiff, which focused almost exclusively on the fact that the
portfolio had lost money (rather than on the reasonableness of the
investment decisions at the time they were made), was off-target or
irrelevant. While the court ultimately accepted the “imaginative”
argument of the defendant and ruled in his favor, its evident surprise
at the nature of the argument suggests the pervasiveness of
hindsight-based thinking in the tort system.
How might the law respond to hindsight bias in tort cases? An
obvious response is the use of jury instructions that inform jurors of
the bias and tell them to focus on the ex ante situation.
Unfortunately, such debiasing techniques appear either to have no
effect on decisions or to reduce hindsight bias by only a limited
degree, leaving a significant gap between ex post and ex ante
decision making.136 The findings on the limited effect of debiasing
techniques suggest that attempts by lawyers to employ such
techniques may also be of limited effectiveness, although there is
room here for future research on the role of lawyers. Because of the
134
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apparent limits on debiasing, we propose some alternative
prescriptions—one simple and clear-cut, but limited to certain sorts
of cases, and the other general and giving rise to important avenues
for future research.
2. Prescriptions
(a) First prescription: Manipulate the information given to jurors
One means of responding to the problem of hindsight bias in
tort cases involves manipulating the set of information given to
jurors. Suppose that a food-processing company is claimed to have
decided in a negligent fashion to use a particular chemical
preservative in its products; imagine that the preservative ended up
causing cancer in a small number of consumers. The company
claims that not using the cancer-causing (as it turned out)
preservative would have carried significant risks to customers in
terms of food contamination. We know that if jurors are told that
the preservative was used and ended up causing cancer, they will be
likely to overestimate the probability of harm from the preservative
and, thus, hold the food-processing company liable even if liability is
not in fact justified under an unbiased application of the negligence
standard. (Indeed, in this context the effects of hindsight bias will
be exacerbated by the fact that the choice made by the defendant is
an act of commission, rather than (as would have been the case had
the preservative not been used) an act of omission.137)
Imagine, however, that jurors are not told that the company
decided to use the preservative; rather they are told only about the ex
ante decision facing the company (whether to use the preservative).
They learn about the benefits and costs of that strategy and must
determine whether either pursuing it or failing to pursue it would
have been negligent. In this way the jurors are transformed into ex
ante decision makers: they don’t know whether the “accident” that
occurred (prompting the lawsuit) was harm from food
contamination or harm from the preservative. Because they do not
know what harm ended up materializing, they will not be led by
hindsight bias to overestimate the probability of that harm. Their
probability estimates for each type of harm—and their resulting
137
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assessment of whether either decision by the company would have
been negligent—will be untouched by hindsight bias. In this way
the effect of hindsight bias on negligence determinations may be
eliminated. (If the decision that the defendant actually made was
one that the jury determined to be negligent, outcome information
would be introduced for purposes of computing damages.)
It is important to note the structure of this example: the
defendant faced a choice of options, each of which could have caused
harm. In this sort of case, jurors assessing the defendant’s conduct
will not know (if they are not told) whether the harm that
prompted the suit was caused by choice of the first option or choice
of the second. It is also important to note that various procedural
steps would have to be taken to protect the secrecy of the
defendant’s choice; lawyers’ affiliations, for example, would have to
be kept from the jury, and witnesses could not be identified as
defense-side or plaintiff-side. (One might worry that the foodprocessing company’s employees would testify in a way that revealed
what choice the company made. But it would not be in the
company’s interests to have its employees testify in such a one-sided
fashion, since then jurors would suspect which choice was made and
would tend to engage in hindsight-biased decision making to the
defendant’s detriment.)
In some cases, it may not be possible to keep the defendant’s
choice from the jury; the fact of the suit will make clear what that
choice was. For example, in the well-known case of Petition of
Kinsman Transit Co.,138 in which a bridge owner failed to hire an
operator to monitor the bridge, the fact of a suit may provide strong
indication that an operator was not hired, resulting in an accident.
In this sort of setting, a possible prescription (offered previously in
the literature) involves bifurcation of trials, so that jurors deciding on
liability do not learn any of the details of the accident until an initial
determination of liability is made.139 Although we think this is a
138
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sensible prescription in such settings, we note that it will not
eliminate the effects of hindsight bias, since (as proponents of
bifurcated trials recognize) “[t]he jury will undoubtedly know that
they are not being asked simply to engage in academic exercise,”140
and that (because a trial is being held) “a bad outcome must have
occurred.”141 In contrast, in cases in which jurors need not know
(because they cannot infer from the fact of a lawsuit) what choice
the defendant made, it is possible to eliminate the hindsight bias
completely. And there are many such situations: cases in which
either of two options facing a physician could have caused harm or
death to a patient; cases in which either the use or the failure to use
a new technology could have harmed consumers; cases in which
either revealing or failing to reveal suicide threats by a psychiatric
patient could have resulted in suicide.
A further feature of our prescription here is that even if we are
wrong about the effects of hindsight bias, the prescription seems
unlikely to do a significant amount of harm. If hindsight bias is
unimportant, then whether jurors are told what outcome occurred is
irrelevant; either way, they are able to make a correct ex ante
determination. Thus, the prescription either has no effect on
decision making (if hindsight bias is not a problem) or represents an
improvement over the current system (if hindsight bias is a
problem).
(b) Second prescription: Alter the evidentiary standard
The result of hindsight bias, as described above, is that jurors will
overestimate the probability that harm will occur (since harm did in
fact occur). The determination of the probability of harm would
conventionally be made under a “preponderance of the evidence”
standard: if jurors think it more likely than not, based on the
evidence, that the probability of harm was above the threshold level
required for liability, they are to find the defendant liable. One
might imagine counteracting the effects of hindsight bias by raising
the evidentiary standard (as an alternative, not in addition, to the
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previous proposal; the two together would produce overcorrection
and, thus, underdeterrence). Thus, for example, if the jurors were to
find the defendant liable only if the evidence suggested at least a
seventy-five percent likelihood—rather than merely a fifty-one
percent likelihood—that the critical harm probability threshold was
met, then they might well reach the correct conclusion about
liability: they would overestimate the likelihood attached to the
critical threshold, but the overestimate might well be below the new
required level.
The highest evidentiary threshold known to our legal
system—the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard—is used only in
criminal cases. However, in civil cases an intermediate standard
(higher than the preponderance standard, but less demanding than
the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard) is the “clear and
convincing evidence” standard. This standard has been adopted by
many states for punitive-damage determinations,142 and a
broadening of its use to all negligence determinations—or at least
those in which hindsight bias seems most likely to present a
significant problem—would provide a counterweight to the
tendency of jurors to overestimate the probability that harm will
occur. This, of course, is likely to be a second-best solution; in some
situations defendants might be found not liable when, under a
perfectly functioning system with no hindsight bias and no
heightened evidentiary standard, they would be found liable.143 This
need not be the case, however, and even if it is, we might well
tolerate a crude measure that produced some errors so long as it
represented an improvement over the current system. Most
importantly, there is much room for research focused on
determining the precise degree of alteration in the evidentiary
threshold that would best respond to the hindsight-bias
problem—either across the board or in particular categories of cases.
Our goal is more to suggest the value of research on this issue than
to urge an immediate change in policy based on what we now
know.
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To fix ideas for purposes of exploring these points, imagine first
that hindsight bias produces a similar increase across cases in a juror’s
perceived likelihood that the negligence threshold is met. (So, for
example, suppose that jurors generally overestimate by fifty percent
the likelihood that the negligence threshold is met, based on the
evidence presented.) In this circumstance, the overestimation of the
likelihood that the negligence threshold is met could be precisely
offset by a change in the evidentiary threshold. To see this point,
imagine that the likelihood that the negligence threshold has been
met is graphed as a function of the strength of the evidence. In the
absence of hindsight bias, the function will cross the fifty-percent
(preponderance) cut-off at a given level of evidentiary strength, and
all cases in which the evidence is stronger than that should produce
findings of liability. But with hindsight bias, jurors will overestimate
the likelihood that the negligence threshold has been met, and this
will produce an upward shift in the function we are imagining; as a
result, too many cases will cross the preponderance line. But if that
line itself is shifted up by an appropriate amount, the hindsightinfluenced function will cross it at precisely the same level of
evidentiary strength as the one at which the original function
crossed the preponderance standard. (For instance, if the likelihood
that the negligence threshold has been met is a linear function of
the strength of the evidence, half of all cases in the system meet the
threshold under the preponderance standard, and jurors overestimate
by fifty percent the likelihood that the threshold is met, then a move
to a seventy-five-percent likelihood requirement would result in the
jurors’ finding negligence in precisely the half of cases in which it
should be found.)
If hindsight bias produces different degrees of distortion in
jurors’ probability estimates across different types of cases, then a
shift to a higher evidentiary standard might result in
underdeterrence of some defendants (specifically those whose
actions will not be judged in a particularly hindsight-biased way).
But as long as the increase in the evidentiary standard is modest
relative to what hindsight bias in the average case warrants, the
change would produce fewer “underdeterrence errors” (findings of
no liability for defendants who should be found liable) than
“overdeterrence errors” (findings of liability for defendants who
should not be found liable). And the change from a move to the
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“clear and convincing evidence” standard would be a relatively
modest one; a survey of federal district court judges found that in the
judges’ view that standard requires a likelihood of sixty to seventy
percent, compared to the fifty-one percent threshold under the
preponderance standard.144 (Of course, more interesting would be
data on how jurors view the two standards.) Moreover, to the extent
that future research can help to pin down the way in which
hindsight bias differentially affects different sorts of cases (assuming
such differential effects exist), the change in the evidentiary standard
may be calibrated to the degree of the hindsight-bias problem.
One response to this analysis is that the reason jurors tend to
find defendants liable even when liability is not legally warranted is
not that jurors overestimate the probability of harm, but simply that
they want to compensate tort victims. Our first prescription
addresses the latter issue as well as the former, for if jurors do not
know what harm occurred, it is difficult for them to engage in
compensation-based decision making. (In the case of the foodprocessing company, the jurors, to ensure compensation for the
harm that occurred, would have to say that the company was
negligent whether it used the preservative or refrained from using
it—probably not a likely scenario.) But as far as the second
prescription is concerned, the problem of compensation-based
decision making remains. So if this is what is going on, jurors may
continue to find defendants liable, regardless of a higher evidentiary
threshold. But there is no reason to think the existence of a higher
threshold will make things worse in this situation, and so as long as
there are some cases in which jurors try faithfully to apply the
negligence standard, moving to the higher evidentiary threshold
may improve decision making.
A final objection might be that altering the evidentiary standard
would not (it is claimed) survive the Kantian-Rawlsian publicity
condition, which means, roughly, that principles of justice must be
defensible publicly, and their basis and content must not be secret.145
The question is whether it is coherent to tell jurors that “Although
this case should be decided by the preponderance of the evidence, we
144
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know that you are likely to think irrationally, so therefore we raise
the threshold to clear and convincing evidence.” We do not believe
that there is anything incoherent, or violative of the publicity
condition, in an idea of this sort. In both private and public life,
people, acting individually or in groups, take steps to ensure against
their own tendencies to make mistakes. (We discussed in Part I.A
the steps that people frequently take to deal with problems of
bounded willpower.) Raising the standard of proof to prevent errors
is consistent with much of the law of evidence, which is also
designed to respond to cognitive errors. As just one example,
consider the general ban on admission of evidence of prior crimes.146
A public defense of such steps is perfectly intelligible.
3. Other applications
The discussion to this point has focused on tort cases decided
under the negligence rule, but similar issues may arise in other areas
of law in which juries (or judges) must determine whether an ex
ante standard was met while armed with the knowledge that a
negative event in fact materialized. One example is securities fraud
litigation, whose perceived excesses prompted Congress to enact the
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995. In a typical securities
fraud case, jurors are confronted with a company whose stock price
experienced a dramatic fall, and they are required to assess whether a
particular issue or problem facing the company, whose disclosure
prompted the fall, should have been disclosed at an earlier stage
(typically before it had become an issue or problem). Jurors in such a
case are required to make an after-the-fact determination of
whether a reasonable ex ante decision maker would have thought
the prospective issue or problem “material” to the average shareholder
based on the information available at the time.147 The problem is
that this determination must be made against the backdrop of
knowledge that the issue or problem in fact materialized, and
produced a large drop in the company’s stock price. In this situation,
jurors will likely find it difficult to see how a reasonable ex ante
decision maker might have thought the prospective issue or problem
146
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nonmaterial. Consistent with this analysis, the main predictor of
whether a securities fraud action is brought seems to be whether
there has been a large change in the company’s share price, not
whether the company’s behavior was reasonable from an ex ante
perspective.148
Another example here involves damage suits for violations of the
fourth amendment. A risk in such suits is that if the allegedly illegal
search did in fact produce damaging evidence (say, drugs or other
contraband), then decision makers are likely to conclude that the
law enforcement agency’s behavior was reasonable. This will be true
even if, from an ex ante perspective (without knowing the eventual
outcome), this behavior would not have been found reasonable.
B. Information Disclosure and Government Advertising
1. Background
Suppose it is agreed that individuals lack adequate information
on a given subject—for example, workplace safety, appliance energy
efficiency, or the effects of drug use. In some such instances the
government may seek to foster comparison shopping and informed
decision making (as in the federal truth-in-lending law, which
requires lenders to announce interest rates, measured the same way);
in other instances the government may have a specific policy goal
(reducing drug use, encouraging the use of energy-efficient
refrigerators). Conventional economics acknowledges the possible
desirability of each of these goals (the second in the case of
phenomena such as externalities), and it often advocates, as means of
achieving them, providing additional information to citizens, either
through a mandate to the relevant private actors (for instance,
employers), or through provision of information by the government
itself.149
The prescription to “provide more information” is striking in its
spareness. Behavioral analysis suggests that this prescription is far too
spare. “Provide more information” says nothing about the way in
148
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which the information will be provided, and yet we know from
much of what has been said already, as well as from empirical work
by scholars such as W. Kip Viscusi, that this will matter a great
deal.150 Thus, for example, we know that people’s perceptions of the
probability of uncertain events is influenced by the salience of the
presentation of these events.
There are several implications of this. One is “anti-prescriptive”:
Prescriptions directed toward fostering comparison shopping—the
first government goal mentioned above—will often be incomplete
and may even be paralyzing, since there is often no “neutral” way to
present information. The second implication is that effective
prescriptive strategies for achieving the second goal mentioned
above—discouraging particular types of behavior—must take
behavioral factors into account. It is not enough simply to “provide
information.” We discuss several examples of this below.
2. Anti-Prescription
Consider the following example of a government attempt to
foster informed decision making: In the case of defined contribution
plans such as 401(k)s, the Labor Department, the relevant
government authority, has ruled that employers must give workers
investment alternatives, and must provide information about those
alternatives (such as risk and returns); but firms are not allowed to
offer “advice” as to how to invest. We think that such spare
guidelines place employers in a very difficult position. The reason is
that the way firms decide to describe and display information on
investment alternatives will have a powerful impact on the choices
employees make.
Consider in this connection a recent study of the division of
retirement savings by university employees between two different
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funds, a safe one (bonds) and a risky one (stocks).151 All the
employees were shown actual historical data on the returns of the
two funds, but this information was displayed in two different ways;
one group was given the distribution of one-year rates of return,
while the other was given a simulated distribution of 30-year rates of
return. Those shown the 30-year returns elected to invest nearly all
their savings in stocks, while those shown the one-year returns
invested a majority of their funds in bonds. Our point is not that
one of these outcomes is better. Our point is simply that in the real
world, he who provides information ends up giving advice.
This is an example in which the prescription to “provide more
information” may be paralyzing; in other instances it may simply be
incomplete. Thus, suppose that the prescription is that certain
private actors be required to provide “information”; what does this
mean? If it means that those who expose people to a dangerous
substance or product in the workplace (say benzene) must provide
them with accurate information about the danger, this leaves open a
tremendous range of possibilities. The actors subject to the mandate
will often have an interest in providing the least scary, most pallid
version of the information possible (for example, “benzene has been
associated with a statistical increase in risk”), while regulators might
want the most scary, salient message available (say, “exposure to
benzene will increase your risk of getting CANCER and other
FATAL diseases”). Of course the best message in this case, if the
goal is accurate knowledge, may well be somewhere in between. An
important goal of the analyst’s task in making prescriptions in this
area is to say how the information should be provided—not just that
it should be provided.
In still other contexts, such as ones in which the presentation of
information will affect people’s preferences rather than just their
perceptions of risk, it is not even clear in theory what is meant by
ensuring “informed decision making.” It is not even clear that there
are steady or stable background preferences that might be
“informed.” The preferences can themselves be an artifact of the
method of informing. For instance, one of the central features of
151
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Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory is that people evaluate
outcomes based on the change they represent from an initial
reference point, rather than based on the nature of the outcome
itself; also, losses from the initial reference point are weighted much
more heavily than gains.152 This aspect of prospect theory (like its
other features) is based on evidence about actual choice behavior.153
The evaluation of outcomes in terms of gains and losses from an
initial reference point, coupled with the special aversion to losses,
means that it matters a great deal whether something is presented as
a gain or a loss relative to the status quo; a perceived threat of a loss
relative to the status quo weighs more heavily than a perceived threat
of foregoing a gain. In such cases it is difficult to say which
individual is “informed”—the one who is told of the perceived threat
of a loss or the one who is told of the perceived threat of foregoing a
gain. In this and other contexts, preferences are not preexisting but
rather “constructive, context-dependent,” analogous to the balls or
strikes that do not predate the situation of choice and that “ain’t
nothing till” the umpire calls them.154
152
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3. Prescriptions
Suppose now that the agreed-upon goal is not to foster
“informed decision making,” but to discourage particular types of
behavior. Conventional economics would view this as a desirable
goal at least to the extent that fully-informed consumers would not
engage in the behavior in question, and to an even greater extent if
the behavior in question produces externality effects. And to achieve
this goal, conventional economics would again prescribe, as one
possible means of achieving it, “more information.” (Other, probably
more usual, means include taxation or regulation designed to
discourage the unwanted behavior.) Quite obviously, though, some
ways of providing information are more effective than others. There
is nothing surprising about this statement. Presumably, when firms
pay millions of dollars to advertising agencies to create splashy new
ad campaigns, they think they are getting something for their
money. Likewise, there is an enormous marketing literature about
how best to shape people’s behavior in desired directions. These
points apply equally to the government. Below we develop briefly
some specific prescriptions for achieving goals that involve changing
people’s behavior.
(a) First Prescription: Exploit Loss Aversion
As just noted, individuals tend to weight losses far more heavily
than gains. As a result, framing consequences in terms of losses
rather than gains is likely to be far more effective in changing
behavior.155 A well-known illustration of this sort of framing effect
is a study involving breast self-examination; pamphlets describing
the positive effects of breast self-examination (for example, women
who undertake such examinations have a greater chance of finding a
tumor at a treatable stage) are ineffective, but there are significant
changes in behavior from pamphlets that stress the negative
consequences of a refusal to undertake self-examinations (women
who fail to perform such examinations have a decreased chance of
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finding a tumor at a treatable stage).156 Note that this example
illustrates how the provision of information may be a more natural
tool than taxation or regulation for discouraging some forms of
behavior (such as the failure to perform a self-examination).
Another familiar example of the effects of framing involves efforts
to inform people of the advantages of energy insulation: an emphasis
on the gains from insulation produced far less change than an
emphasis on the losses from noninsulation.157 In general, people are
far more likely to act when told, “if you do not use this strategy, you
will lose X amount,” than when told, “if you do use this strategy, you
will save X amount.”
(b) Second prescription: Exploit salience
Effective prescriptive strategies need to take account of the fact
that vivid and personal information will often be more effective than
statistical evidence. This sort of information has a high degree of
salience, and, as a result of the availability heuristic, people will tend
to respond to it by attaching a higher probability to the event in
question. Thus an anti-drug advertisement, showing a frying egg
with the announcer’s voice claiming, “this is your brain on drugs,”
may well have had a substantial impact on behavior, far more
substantial than other, flatter advertisements; availability suggests
that the former ad would produce a higher perceived probability of
negative effects from the drug than the latter.
(c) Third prescription: Avoid the pitfalls of overoptimism
As noted in the previous section, a common feature of human
behavior is overoptimism.158 This behavior is not specific to the
young, although it may be diminished as people move beyond
middle to old age, as Richard Posner has suggested.159 What does
156
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this feature of behavior imply about government provision of
information? Consider the choice between a safe-driving campaign
focused on drivers’ own driving and the ingenuous campaign actually
adopted by the government: “Drive defensively: Watch out for the
other guy.” The government’s campaign, perhaps self-consciously,
responded to the fact that most people tend to believe that they are
unusually safe drivers. This is a model of the sort of prescriptive
approach advocated by behavioral analysis.
C. Behavior of Criminals
1. Background
Our discussion of prescriptive analysis has thus far focused on
bounded rationality. But bounded willpower may also play a role.
Consider the question of deterring criminal behavior. Economic
analysis of this question typically starts from the premise that
potential offenders will be deterred from criminal acts if the expected
costs of those acts exceed their expected benefits.160 Potential
offenders are imagined to make at least a rough calculation of these
costs and benefits in the process of making their decisions. Bounded
rationality suggests that people may make systematic (as opposed to
random) errors in computing these costs and benefits; for example,
as described above, individuals tend to judge the likelihood of
uncertain events (such as getting caught for a crime) by how
available such instances are to the human mind, and this may
depend on factors unrelated to the actual probability of the event.
This analysis suggests the desirability, from a prescriptive standpoint,
of making law enforcement highly visible, holding constant the
actual probability that offenders will be caught; it suggests, for
example, the good sense of the familiar method of parking-ticket
enforcement—sticking large, brightly-colored tickets that read
“VIOLATION” in large letters on the drivers’ side window, where
they are particularly noticeable to drivers passing by—as opposed to a
less costly approach (putting small, plain tickets under the
windshield wiper on the curb side of the street (convenient for the
parking officer to reach)). Another example here is “community
policing,” now widely practiced across the country; by making more
160
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visible and memorable the presence of police (as, for example, by
having them walk their beats rather than ride in patrol cars),
authorities can, it is suggested, increase the deterrence of potential
criminals without altering the actual probability of apprehension.
Empirical evidence suggests that this is what actually occurs in the
case of community policing.161
But even if one assumes that potential offenders can accurately
compute the costs and benefits of crime, bounded willpower
suggests that they will often behave in ways at odds with
conventional economic analysis, due to problems of self-control. A
central feature of much criminal behavior is that the benefits are
immediate, while the costs (if they are incurred at all) are spread out
over time—often a very long time. Economic analysis assumes that
such future costs are discounted to their present value at the rate at
which individuals can borrow or lend according to their
circumstances.162 A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell have
recently generalized this analysis by suggesting that potential
criminal offenders may have unusually high discount rates, so that
lengthy terms of imprisonment will have relatively little effect
(because years far in the future will be discounted so heavily).163
Behavioral economic analysis carries this idea further by
incorporating
self-control
issues often
emphasized
by
criminologists.164
2. Prescriptions
As just noted, the existing economic analyses assume a constant
discount rate (although perhaps a high one); this means that the
difference between the attractiveness (or aversiveness) of a reward (or
punishment) today versus tomorrow is the same as the difference
between a year from now and a year and one day from now. In
161
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contrast to this theory, there is considerable evidence that people
display sharply declining discount rates.165 This means that
impatience is very strong for near rewards (and aversion very strong
for near punishments) but that each of these declines over time—a
pattern referred to as “hyperbolic discounting.”166 In an illuminating
overstatement, Jon Elster has referred to this as the “absolute priority
of the present”—akin to the “absolute priority [of the self] over other
persons: I am I—while they are all ‘out there.’”167 Richard Posner
has recently applied these ideas to issues of aging and old age,168 and
their application to criminal offenders is supported by the idea that
such offenders often behave “impulsive[ly]” and then have to
“exaggerat[e] the benefits of crime” in order to justify their behavior
to themselves later.169 (This would not occur with the ordinary
discounting assumed by most conventional economic analysis;
decisions would not be regretted later because with that form of
discounting there is no time inconsistency of preference.170)
What does hyperbolic discounting imply for effective deterrence
of criminal behavior? With this sort of bounded willpower on the
part of potential offenders, the difference between not getting
caught and being imprisoned for, say, a year differs dramatically from
the difference between being imprisoned for ten years and being
imprisoned for eleven years (even apart from any fixed costs that may
accompany the fact of conviction). While the standard theory says
that these two things differ only insofar as the costs of
imprisonment in year eleven must be discounted to present value in
order to be compared with the loss of wages and personal freedom in
year one, behavioral economic analysis (and basic common sense)
165
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tells us that this is not so. Short punishments will thus have much
more effect than long punishments as a result of the “priority of the
present”; adding years onto a sentence will produce little additional
deterrence. (This is also true under Polinsky and Shavell’s approach,
but for a different reason.)
Our analysis is consistent with empirical evidence suggesting
that criminal behavior is correlated with high levels of self-control
problems. Studies have found, for example, that drunk-driving
behavior is significantly correlated with a general practice of not
wearing a seat belt—itself a behavior that seems to suggest a very
high weight on the present, and thus a lack of self-control in the
sense used here.171 Another interesting piece of empirical evidence
concerns offenders’ views of sentences of different lengths. One
study found that they view a five-year term of imprisonment as, on
average, only twice as bad as a one-year term; the five-year term had
a perceived severity of 200, compared to 100 for the one-year
term.172 This alone is also consistent with a high discount rate—a
rate of roughly .5. But with that discount rate, the difference
between a five- and ten-year term should be quite small
(approximately 6 on the severity measure); in fact, the difference was
300.173 This difference is also somewhat higher than hyperbolic
discounting would suggest; if the difference between 100 and 200
represents a .25 weight on all years after the first year (so that the
five-year term’s severity is 100 + 25 + 25 + 25 + 25 = 200), then the
ten-year term’s severity would be 325—much closer than the 206
predicted by the non-hyperbolic approach, although still less than
the actual severity rating of 500. These data are of course only
suggestive; we have not shown that the bounded willpower
approach leads to improved predictions of actual criminal behavior.
Empirical work on actual behavior of this sort is notoriously
difficult, but scholars such as Steven Levitt have begun to
demonstrate the possibilities in this area.174 A full analysis of
171
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criminal behavior would also need to incorporate other factors not
considered here (such as the role of community): our goal is only to
sketch some of the many ways in which conventional economic
analysis of criminal law can be usefully extended using the tools of
behavioral analysis.
V. Normative Analysis: Anti-Antipaternalism
This Part turns to the normative issues raised in the
introduction. As noted there, conventional law and economics is
often strongly antipaternalistic in its orientation. The idea of
“consumer sovereignty” plays a large role; citizens, assuming they
have reasonable access to relevant information, are thought to be the
best judges of what will promote their own welfare. Yet many of the
instances of bounded rationality discussed above call this idea into
question—and also, as we will emphasize below, call into question
the idea that intervention by government actors, who themselves
may face the same cognitive or motivational problems as everyone
else, can improve matters. In this way bounded rationality pushes
toward a sort of anti-antipaternalism—a skepticism about
antipaternalism, but not an affirmative defense of paternalism. We
also note (although we do not explore this point here) that while
bounded rationality may increase the need for law (if government’s
failings are less serious than citizens’), bounded self-interest may
reduce it, by creating norms that solve collective action problems
even without government intervention.175
A. Citizen Error
Many of the forms of bounded rationality discussed above call
into question the idea of consumer sovereignty. Consider
overoptimism—the tendency of most people to assume that their
own risk of a negative outcome is far lower than other people’s.
Consistent with this phenomenon, young smokers appear to
overestimate by significant margins the likelihood that they will
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quit.176 Similarly, the effect of salience may lead to substantial
underestimation of certain risks encountered in everyday life (for
example, the risks from poor diet), since these harms may not be very
salient. When overoptimism is combined with salience, it appears
likely that people will underestimate many risks. We emphasize that
these problems are not ones of insufficient information per se; they
are ones of insufficient ability to process accurately the information
one possesses insofar as that information bears on one’s own risks.
Thus, for example, people may have adequate information about the
risks of smoking,177 but this does not at all imply that they have
adequate perceptions of the risks of smoking that they themselves
face.178 Even if people can obtain accurate statistical knowledge,
statistical knowledge may not be enough to inform actual choices. It
does not follow from this that information is useless; it is just that
having information per se does not automatically imply optimal
behavior.
Further questions about the idea of consumer sovereignty arise
from the gap between “decision” and “experience” utility. It is often
assumed that the utility of actual experience is best measured by the
anticipated utility as revealed by people’s decisions. A’s choice to do X
best shows what welfare will be gained by A’s doing X. This
assumption is often treated as an axiom, or at least as a proposition
that could not be falsified. But behavioral research shows that
people’s judgments about their future experience at the time of
decision can be mistaken, in the sense that people sometimes have a
hard time (even apart from the sorts of informational issues
recognized by conventional economics) assessing what the
experience will actually be like.179 Thus, for example, people do not
accurately predict the consequences of winning the lottery or
becoming paraplegic. They tend to underestimate their ability to
adapt to negative changes, a point that may bear on law and policy
176
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in such areas as global climate change.180 And they overestimate the
gains in happiness they will experience from events such as winning
the lottery.
An especially interesting example of the gap between decision
and experience utility comes from studies dealing with HIV testing.
At the time of decision whether to test, people are quite terrified of
their reaction to finding out that they are HIV-positive; they predict
a high degree of panic and depression. But a recent study suggests
that people are able to adapt to the bad news, and their panic and
depression are far less severe than they thought ex ante.181 If the
experience is less bad than expected, then perhaps people will
“undertest” in terms of their own welfare. If people underpredict
their powers of adaptation to a positive result, there may be a
legitimate domain for initiatives designed to correct mispredicted
utility.
This suggestion raises a complex normative question: Is a
person’s measure of welfare after the test results come back the
appropriate measure of value? Perhaps people, through coping
mechanisms, are able to adapt to disease better than they anticipate
in advance, but does this mean that disease is a less severe problem
than pre-test attitudes would have suggested? On conventional
utilitarian grounds, the answer is probably affirmative; the subjective
experience is what counts. But a well-established challenge to
utilitarian analysis suggests the possibility of a negative answer, on
the ground that subjective experience may not be all that counts.182
What we mean to suggest here is a simple point: people sometimes
do mispredict their utility at the time of decision, and on
conventional grounds, this phenomenon raises serious problems for
the idea of consumer sovereignty.
B. Behavioral Bureaucrats
Any suggestion that the government should intervene in
response to people’s mistakes raises the question whether the
180
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government will be able to avoid such errors. The prospects for
productive and useful intervention may be smallest in the case of
populist government; the actions of such a government, based
heavily on pressures coming from citizens, may tend to be subject to
the very same biases and errors that afflict citizens. (Thus behavioral
analysis complements existing accounts of the problems with
populism.) An example of the effects of populism is the Superfund
statute, discussed in Part III.C; irregular perceptions of risk by
ordinary people may tend to produce irregularities in regulation, as
the cognitive errors that ordinary people make are replicated in
statutory and administrative law.183 The effects of social interaction
may even make government action worse, and more dangerous,
than individual errors. Our earlier discussion suggests a possible
mechanism: Availability entrepreneurs in the private sector can
heighten the demand for regulation, and public sector availability
entrepreneurs can take advantage of, and heighten, this effect, by
advocating anecdote-driven policy. Thus public choice accounts of
legislation can work productively with behavioral accounts; there is a
good deal of synergy between behavioral mechanisms and interest
group leaders, many of whom are amateur (or professional?)
behavioral economists. The pollutant-of-the-month syndrome in
environmental law is paralleled by many measures responding to the
crisis-of-the-month. These difficulties with populist government
also point to problems with the referendum process.
But populist government is not the only worry. Government
will often be subject to cognitive and motivational problems even if
it is not populist. (Bureaucrats may also lack appropriate incentives to
make decisions in the public interest.184) Thus, for example, there is
no necessary reason to think that government officials are, by virtue
of their offices, able to avoid overoptimism or predict experience
utility. On the other hand, a degree of insulation from populist
pressures, combined with knowledge of behavioral economics,
might produce some improvement. New institutions may play a role;
183
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consider Justice Breyer’s plea for an insulated body of specialized civil
servants, entrusted with the job of comparing risks and ensuring
that resources are devoted to the most serious problems;185 Howard
Margolis’ behaviorally-informed suggestion that government should
be required to ensure that all initiatives do “more good than
harm”;186 even proposals for cost-benefit analysis, understood in a
behavioral light as an attempt to overcome biases and confusions in
both perception and motivation.187 We also emphasize that
government intervention need not come in highly coercive forms;
perhaps distortions in people’s decision making can be overcome by
information campaigns falling well short of coercion. For instance,
in the contexts of risks such as smoking, might debiasing techniques
work to link the statistical evidence with the personal reality?
All of the foregoing ideas raise many complexities; and we have
not even touched upon the complicated philosophical literature on
the legitimacy of paternalism. Application of these ideas to any
specific topic in law would require a much fuller development of
many issues than the space in this Article permits. But we need not
leave the ideas in purely abstract form; consider the following simple
illustration of their application. Imagine that sunlamps are being
sold in an unregulated market and that it is learned that many
consumers fall asleep under the lamps, burning themselves badly.
Consumers make this mistake in spite of warnings included on the
package and in the instructions, perhaps because they fail to
anticipate that lying in a warm place with one’s eyes closed is likely
to induce sleep. Let’s call this an “unintended risk,” meaning a risk
that consumers fail to appreciate. The existence of this unintended
risk leaves open the possibility of welfare-enhancing regulation.
Suppose, for example, that an automatic timer can be added to the
sunlamp at a cost of twenty-five cents, and that manufacturers have
not included this feature because consumers do not anticipate that
they will need it. We do not discuss here the issues raised by the
possibility that a government mandate of the timer interferes with
185
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freedom, rightly conceived. Nor do we address possible distributive
issues (all will pay more for sunlamps, although perhaps only some
failed to appreciate the risks of falling asleep). All we suggest is that
an important part of the analysis involves asking whether the cost of
requiring this safety-promoting feature (twenty-five cents per
customer) is less than the cost of the unanticipated burns.
A central point of this example is that from the perspective of
behavioral law and economics, issues of paternalism are to a
significant degree empirical questions, not questions to be answered
on an a priori basis. No axiom demonstrates that people make
choices that serve their best interests; this is a question to be based
on evidence. Of course the case for intervention is weakened to the
extent that public institutions are likely to make things worse rather
than better. What we are suggesting is that facts, and assessment of
costs and benefits, should replace assumptions that beg the
underlying questions.
Conclusion
Traditional law and economics is largely based on the standard
assumptions of neoclassical economics. These assumptions are
sometimes useful but often false. People display bounded rationality:
they suffer from certain biases, such as overoptimism and self-serving
conceptions of fairness; they follow heuristics, such as availability,
that lead to mistakes; and they behave in accordance with prospect
theory rather than expected utility theory. People also have bounded
willpower; they can be tempted and are sometimes myopic. They
take steps to overcome this limitations. Finally, people are
(fortunately!) boundedly self-interested. They are concerned about
the well-being of others, even strangers in some circumstances, and
this concern and their self-conception can lead them in the
direction of cooperation at the expense of their material self-interest
(and sometimes spite, also at the expense of their material selfinterest). Most of these bounds can be and have been made part of
formal models.
In this article we have sketched some of the implications of
enriching the traditional analysis by incorporating a more realistic
conception of human behavior. We have insisted on the value and
importance of using the three bounds in the economic analysis of
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law; more tentatively, we have explored a series of legal problems in
which the bounds may be significant. Obviously there is a great deal
of research to be done, and one of our principal goals has been to
outline areas that could benefit from further work, both analytic and
empirical.
We do not doubt that replacing the simple maximizing model of
economics with a more complicated psychological treatment comes
at some cost. Solving optimization problems is usually easier than
describing actual behavior. As Herbert Simon said, economics makes
things hard on agents, but easy on economists; behavioral
economics, we suggest, does the opposite. We recapitulate here some
of the reasons we think the enriched model is worth the trouble for
those interested in the economic analysis of law.
1. Some of the predictions of the standard model are simply
wrong. For example, people can be both more spiteful and more
cooperative than traditional analysis predicts, and this matters a great
deal to law. It is also important to know that even in a world
without transactions costs and wealth effects, the assignment of
property rights alters the allocation of resources, and that this may be
particularly true for certain forms of property-rights assignment
(such as court orders). These features of the world matter greatly for
making predictions and formulating policy.
2. In other cases economics makes no predictions (or incorrect
predictions of no effect). Prominent in this category are the effects
of presentation; since economic theory assumes that choices are
invariant to the manner in which a problem is framed, it falsely
predicts that the language of a media account or advertisement has
no effect on behavior, holding the information content constant. In
contrast, it is well established that people react differently to
potential outcomes depending on whether they are perceived as
foregone gains or out-of-pocket costs (losses), and that they are
likely to think, mistakenly, that salient events are more common
than equally prevalent but more subtle ones. These points bear on
the supply of and the demand for law, and on the behavior of agents
in their interactions with the legal system.
3. Standard economic theories of the content of law are based
on an unduly limited range of potential explanations, namely
optimal (or second-best) rules set by judges and rent-seeking
legislation determined by self-interested log-rolling. Behavioral
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economics offers other sources of potential explanation—most
prominently, perceptions of fairness. We have tried to show that
many laws which are seemingly inefficient and do not benefit
powerful interest groups may be explained on grounds of judgments
about right and wrong.
4. A behavioral approach to law and economics offers a host of
novel prescriptions regarding how to make the legal system work
better. Some stem from the improved predictions mentioned in
point 2 above. Cognitive difficulties and motivational distortions
undermine or alter conventional economic prescriptions about the
jury's role, most notably in the context of assessing negligence and
making other factual determinations. We have taken some
preliminary steps in suggesting ways to reduce the costs of some of
these problems.
5. A behavioral approach to law and economics produces new
questions about possible mistakes by private and public actors. On
the one hand, it raises serious doubts
about the reflexive
antipaternalism of some of economic analysis of law. On the other
hand, it raises equivalent questions about whether even wellmotivated public officials will be able to offer appropriate responses
to private mistakes and confusion.
We hope that this article will encourage others to conduct the
research, both theoretical and empirical, that will be needed to flesh
out the behavioral approach for which we have argued here. This
approach will use traditional economic tools, enhanced by a better
understanding of human behavior. Thirty years from now, we hope
that there will be no such thing as behavioral economics. Instead we
hope that economists and economically oriented lawyers will simply
incorporate the useful findings of other social sciences, and in so
doing, transform economics into behavioral economics, and
economic analysis of law into one of its most important branches.
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Appendix: Framework and Summary of Applications
This appendix summarizes our framework for behavioral law and
economics. It also lists the law and economics issues we analyze
within each category of the framework. The specific behavioral
mechanisms we draw upon, which are summarized here, do not
constitute an exhaustive list of the mechanisms that might be
relevant to law and economics; they simply reflect the mechanisms
we have used here.
1.Bounded rationality
a. Judgment errors
self-serving bias (Babcock & Loewenstein, supra note x; Daniel
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution, in Barriers to
Conflict Resolution 44 (Kenneth Arrow et al. eds. 1995))
applications: bargaining around court orders; failed negotiations
availability heuristic (Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 8)
applications: environmental legislation, government advertising,
anti-antipaternalism
hindsight bias (Fischoff, supra note 121)
applications: negligence determinations; other determinations of
fact.
omission bias (Ritov & Baron, supra note 137)
applications: negligence determinations; other determinations of
fact
overoptimism (Weinstein, supra note 128)
applications: government advertising, anti-antipaternalism
inability to predict experience utility (Kahneman, supra note 179)
applications: anti-antipaternalism
b. Decision making behavior
loss aversion (Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 10)
applications: government advertising
endowment effect (a corollary of loss aversion) (Kahneman,
Knetsch, & Thaler, supra note 22)
applications: bargaining around court orders, mandatory contract
terms, prior restraints on speech
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2. Bounded willpower
“hyperbolic” discounting (Laibson, supra note 166)
applications: criminal behavior
3. Bounded self-interest
fairness behavior and spitefulness (Colin Camerer & Richard
Thaler, 9 J. Econ. Perspectives 209 (1995)
applications: bargaining around court orders; bans on market
transactions; prior restraints on speech
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